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| 1. Record Nr.           | UNISALENTO991002596459707536   |
| Autore                  | Propertius, Sextus   |
| Titolo                  | Elegiae / recensuit Lucianus Müller  |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa      | Lipsia : Teubner, 1898   |
| Descrizione fisica      | 138 p. ; 17 cm.  |
| Collana                 | Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana  |
| Altri autori (Persone)  | Müller, Luciano  |
| Disciplina              | 874.01   |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | Latino   |
| Formato                 | Materiale a stampa   |
| Livello bibliografico   | Monografia   |
| -----                   |  |
| 2. Record Nr.           | UNISA990003636490203316  |
| Autore                  | ARISTOPHANES   |
| Titolo                  | La pace / Aristofane ; con introduzione, testo e commento esplicativo per cura di Giovanni Caramia |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa      | Lanciano, : Carabba, 1929  |
| Descrizione fisica      | 167 p. ; 20 cm   |
| Collana                 | Classici greci   |
| Disciplina              | 882.01   |
| Soggetti                | Commedia greca   |
| Collocazione            | FG 26,3  |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | Italiano<br>Greco antico   |
| Formato                 | Materiale a stampa   |
| Livello bibliografico   | Monografia   |

3. Record Nr.	UNINA9910968229503321
Autore	Valencia Fabian
Titolo	Central Bank Independence and Macro-Prudential Regulation // Fabian Valencia, Kenichi Ueda
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2012
ISBN	9781475511635 1475511639 9781475581171 1475581173
Edizione	[1st ed.]
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (28 p.)
Collana	IMF Working Papers IMF working paper ; ; WP/12/101
Altri autori (Persone)	UedaKenichi
Disciplina	332.1/52
Soggetti	Banks and banking, Central Banks and banking Banks and Banking Finance: General Inflation Macroeconomics Money and Monetary Policy Optimization Techniques Programming Models Dynamic Analysis Macroeconomics: Consumption Saving Wealth Contingent Pricing Futures Pricing option pricing Price Level Deflation Banks Depository Institutions Micro Finance Institutions Mortgages General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General Banking

Finance  
Monetary economics  
Price stabilization  
Financial sector stability  
Credit  
Prices  
Government policy  
Financial services industry  
Option pricing

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Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references.
Nota di contenuto	Cover; Contents; I: Introduction; II: Model Setup; III: Social Planner Benchmark; IV: Time inconsistency in a dual-mandate central bank; V: Separation of Objectives Achieves Social Optimum; VI: The role of political independence; A: Non-Independent Central Bank and Independent Macro-prudential Regulator; B: Non-Independent Macro-prudential Regulator and Independent Central Bank; VII: Welfare Comparisons; List of Tables; 1 Welfare Loss Across Institutional Arrangements; VIII: Conclusions; References; Appendices; I: Non-Independent Single Authority; II: Distortionary Macro-prudential Regulation
Sommario/riassunto	<p>We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social optimum to reduce the real value of private debt. This inefficient outcome arises when macro-prudential policies cannot be adjusted as frequently as monetary. Importantly, this result arises even when the central bank is politically independent. We then consider the role of political pressures in the spirit of Barro and Gordon (1983). We show that if either the macro-prudential regulator or the central bank (or both) are not politically independent, separation of price and financial stability objectives does not deliver the social optimum.</p>

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