

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910974486403321
Titolo	Local commons and global interdependence : heterogeneity and cooperation in two domains // edited by Robert O. Keohane and Elinor Ostrom
Pubbl/distr/stampa	London ; ; Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Sage Publications, 1995 London ; ; Thousand Oaks, Calif. : , : Sage Publications, , 1995
ISBN	9780803979628 0803979622 9781446265178 144626517X 9781283881371 1283881373 9781446231548 1446231542
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (viii, 261 pages) : illustrations
Altri autori (Persone)	KeohaneRobert O <1941-> (Robert Owen) OstromElinor
Disciplina	333.717
Soggetti	International cooperation Environmental protection - International cooperation Commons Natural resources, Communal Communication in international relations
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	"Published under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University." "Previously published as a special issue of the Journal of theoretical politics, vol. 6 (1994), no. 4".
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto	Cover; Contents; Notes on Contributors; Chapter 1 - Introduction; Part I - Theoretical Puzzles; Chapter 2 - The Problem of Scale in Human/Environment Relationships; Chapter 3 - The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity and Institutions; Chapter 4 - Heterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems; Part II - Evidence from

the Laboratory; Chapter 5 - Heterogeneities, Information and Conflict Resolution: Experimental Evidence on Sharing Contracts; Part III - Evidence from the Field; Chapter 6 - Constituting Social Capital and Collective Action
Chapter 7 - The Conditions for Successful Collective Action Chapter 8 - Self-interest and Environmental Management; Chapter 9 - Heterogeneities at Two Levels: States, Non-state Actors and Intentional Oil Pollution; Index

Sommario/riassunto

This volume offers a synthesis of what is known about very large and very small common-pool resources. At an international level, states cannot appeal to authoritative hierarchies to enforce agreements they make to cooperate with one another. In some small-scale settings, participants may be just as helpless in calling on distant public officials to monitor and enforce their agreements.
