

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910973660603321
Titolo	Democratic constitutional design and public policy : analysis and evidence // edited by Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Cambridge, Mass., : MIT Press, c2006
ISBN	1-282-09765-2 9786612097652 0-262-27073-0 1-4294-7725-3
Edizione	[1st ed.]
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (384 p.)
Altri autori (Persone)	CongletonRoger D SwedenborgBirgitta <1941->
Disciplina	320.6
Soggetti	Comparative government Political science - Decision making Rational choice theory Political planning Policy sciences Economic policy Constitutional law
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Papers originally presented at a conference sponsored by the Center for Business and Policy Studies.
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto	Introduction : Rational choice politics and institutions / Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg -- Direct democracy : designing a living constitution / Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer -- Constitutions and economic policy / Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini -- Party-line voting and committee assignments in the mixed-member system / Thomas Stratmann -- The effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies / Daniel Diermeier, Hulya Eraslan, and Antonio Merlo -- On the merits of bicameral legislatures : intragovernmental bargaining and policy stability / Roger D. Congleton -- Bicameralism and political compromise in representative democracy / John Charles Bradbury and W. Mark Crain -- Federalism : a constitutional perspective / Dennis C. Mueller -- Common tax pool

problems in federal systems / Brian Knight -- Judicial independence and economic development / Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt -- Constitutions and prosperity : the impact of legal and economic institutions on the wealth of nations / Randall G. Holcombe, Robert A. Lawson, and James D. Gwartney -- Amendment procedures and constitutional stability / Bjrn Erik Rasch and Roger D. Congleton -- Designing constitutional stability / Barry R. Weingast.

Sommario/riassunto

Leading scholars in rational choice analysis present the public choice, new institutionalist, and new political economy perspectives on the political and economic effects of constitutional design and review the accumulating empirical evidence.
