

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910972475103321
Autore	Shlapentokh Vladimir
Titolo	Freedom, repression, and private property in Russia / / Vladimir Shlapentokh, Michigan State University, Anna Arutunyan, Independent journalist
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2013
ISBN	1-107-46188-X 1-139-89349-1 1-107-45972-9 1-316-60933-2 1-107-46539-7 1-107-47254-7 1-107-46894-9 1-107-32378-9 1-107-47352-7
Edizione	[1st ed.]
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (vii, 208 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)
Disciplina	947.086
Soggetti	Democracy - Russia (Federation) Civil rights - Russia (Federation) Property - Political aspects - Russia (Federation) Free enterprise - Political aspects - Russia (Federation) Russia (Federation) Politics and government 1991-
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto	Private property and big money in political regimes in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia: a theoretical overview -- Ideology and public opinion in a centralized society and in a fragmented society -- Corruption, the power of state and big business in the Soviet and post-Soviet regimes -- Enemies and the issue of legitimization in the Soviet and post-Soviet regimes -- Political police before and after -- Treatment of strikers in Soviet and post-Soviet times: Novocherkassk and Mezhdurechensk -- Foreign policy: the geopolitical factor before and money after -- A freedom which Putin dearly loves -- "the right to leave his country."

Sommario/riassunto

This study demonstrates how the emergence of private property and a market economy after the Soviet Union's collapse enabled a degree of freedom while simultaneously supporting authoritarianism. Based on case studies, Vladimir Shlapentokh and Anna Arutunyan analyze how private property and free markets spawn feudal elements in society. These elements are so strong in post-Communist Russia that they prevent the formation of a true democratic society, while making it impossible to return to totalitarianism. The authors describe the resulting Russian society as having three types of social organization: authoritarian, feudal and liberal. The authors examine the adaptation of Soviet-era institutions like security forces, the police and the army to free market conditions and how they generated corruption; the belief that the KGB was relatively free from corruption; how large property holdings merge with power and necessitate repression; and how property relations affect government management and suppression.
