1. Record Nr. UNINA9910971729803321 Autore Northoff Georg Titolo Philosophy of the Brain: The Brain Problem // Georg Northoff Pubbl/distr/stampa Philadelphia, PA, USA, : John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2003 John Benjamins Publishing Company **ISBN** 9786612255304 9789027295873 9027295875 9781282255302 1282255304 9781423772286 1423772288 Edizione [1st ed.] Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (443 p.) Collana Advances in consciousness research, , 1381-589X ; ; v. 52 128/.2 Disciplina Soggetti Mind-brain identity theory Philosophy of mind **PHILOSOPHY** Mind & Body Lingua di pubblicazione Inglese **Formato** Materiale a stampa Livello bibliografico Monografia Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph Note generali Includes bibliographical references (pages 365-401) and index. Nota di bibliografia Philosophy of the Brain -- Editorial page -- Title page -- LCC page --Nota di contenuto Dedication page -- Table of contents -- Acknowledgements -- The `Brain problem' -- 1.1. The `Brain problem' -- 1.1.1. `Mind problems' in the 'philosophy of mind' -- 1.1.2. 'Brain Problem' in the 'philosophy of the brain' -- 1.2. Definition of the brain and 'dilemma of the brain' -- 1.2.1. The definition of the brain -- 1.2.2. The 'dilemma of the brain' -- 1.3. Hypothesis of 'embedment' -- 1.3.1. Defining 'embedment' -- 1.3.2. Defining 'neurophilosophical hypothesis' -- 1.3.3. Defining the brain -- 1.3.4. Strategy of investigation -- 1.4. Neurophilosophy as a method for investigation of the brain -- 1.4.1. Defining 'Neurophilosophy' -- 1.4.2. Principles of transdisciplinary methodology -- 1.4.3. 'Ontology' and 'epistemology'

in neurophilosophy -- 1.4.4. `Neurophilosophical hypothesis' -- 1.4.5.

`Standard arguments' against neurophilosophy --Neuroepistemological account of the brain -- 2.1. Spatial embedment': The body and the own body -- 2.1.1. `Bodily embedment': `Phenomenal space' -- 2.1.2. `Individual embedment': `Intra-subjective character' of `phenomenal space' --Neuroepistemological implications: Body as spatial centre and `intrasubjective character' of `phenomenal space' -- 2.1.3. `Emotional embedment': `Phenomenal-qualitative character' of `phenomenal space' -- Neuroepistemological implications: Emotions and the `phenomenal-qualitative character' of `phenomenal space' -- Spatioemotional linkage and 'phenomenal-qualitative character' of 'phenomenal space' -- 2.2. 'Temporal embedment': The own body and other bodies -- 2.2.1. `Environmental embedment': `Phenomenal time' -- Neuroepistemological implications: Sensorimotor integration and 'phenomenal time' -- The relationship between 'phenomenal time' and `physical time'. 2.2.2. Intra-subjective embedment': 'Phenomenal judgment' --Neuroepistemological implications: `Agency/action judgments' and `phenomenal judgments' -- 2.2.3. `Inter-subjective embedment': `Physical judgment' -- Neuroepistemological implications: Observation of action and 'physical judgments' -- 2.3. 'Mental embedment': The brain and the own body -- 2.3.1. `Goal-oriented embedment': `Autoepistemic limitation' and mental states -- Neuroepistemological implications: `Embedded coding' and mental states -- 2.3.2. `Stateoriented embedment': Feelings and qualia -- Neuroepistemological implications: Emotions and qualia -- 2.3.3. `Act-oriented embedment': Intentionality and mental causation -- Neuroepistemological implications: Intentionality and qualia -- 2.4. 'Reflexive embedment': The own brain and other brains -- 2.4.1. `Neural embedment': First-Person Perspective -- Neuroepistemological implications: Imagery and First-Person Perspective -- 2.4.2. `Personal embedment': Second-Person Perspective -- Neuroepistemological implications: Autobiographical memory and Second-Person Perspective -- 2.4.3. `Social embedment': Third-Person Perspective -- Neuroepistemological implications: Social cognition and Third-Person Perspective --`Philosophy of the brain' -- 3.1. Empirical hypothesis of the brain: `Dynamic brain', `event coding', and `embedded brain' -- 3.1.1. The dynamic organisation of the brain -- 3.1.2. The 'dynamic brain': `Dynamic states' and `First-Brain Perspective' -- 3.1.3. The `brain code': `Event coding' and the `empirical mind problem' -- 3.1.4. The `embedded brain': `Mental presentation' and `context-dependence' --'Mental presentation' as 'embedded representation' -- 3.2. `Epistemology of the brain': `Embedded epistemology', `epistemology of events and environments' and First-, Second-, and Third-Person Epistemology. 3.2.1. `First-Person Epistemology' and `Embedded epistemology' --3.2.2. 'Second-Person Epistemology' and consciousness -- 3.2.3. `Third-Person Epistemology' and thought/language -- 3.3. `Ontology of the brain': `Embedded brain', `embedded ontology' and `selfreference' of the brain -- 3.3.1. `Neuroontology': Brain as an `isolated brain' -- 3.3.2. 'Neuroontology': The brain as an 'embedded brain' --'Mental causation' and 'Dynamic causation' -- 3.3.3. 'Ontology of the brain': `Embedded ontology' -- 3.3.4. `Ontology of the brain': `Selfreference' of the brain -- The `Embedded brain' -- 4.1. The determination of the brain -- 4.1.1. What is the brain? -- 4.1.2. How can we characterize the brain? -- 4.1.3. When can we speak of a brain? -- 4.1.4. Where can we investigate the brain? -- 4.1.5. Why do we have

a brain? -- 4.2. The `Dilemma of the brain' -- 4.2.1. `Empirical

dilemma' -- 4.2.2. `Epistemic dilemma' -- 4.2.3. `Ontological dilemma' -- 4.2.4. `Disciplinary dilemma' -- 4.2.5. `Logical dilemma' -- 4.3. Hypothesis of `Embedment' -- 4.3.1. The definition of the brain -- 4.3.2. Development of novel, corresponding and appropriate concepts in neuroscience, epistemology and ontology -- 4.3.3. The linkage between `brain problem' and `mind problems' -- 4.4. `Paradigm shift' -- 4.4.1. The `Paradigm shift' in neuroscience -- 4.4.2. The `paradigm shift' in epistemology -- 4.4.3. The `paradigm shift' in ontology -- 4.4.4. The `paradigm shift' in philosophy -- References.

Sommario/riassunto

"What is the mind?""What is the relationship between brain and mind?" These are common questions. But "What is the brain?" is a rare question in both the neurosciences and philosophy. The reason for this may lie in the brain itself: Is there a "brain problem"? In this fresh and innovative book, Georg Northoff demonstrates that there is in fact a "brain problem". He argues that our brain can only be understood when its empirical functions are directly related to the modes of acquiring knowledge, our epistemic abilities and inabilities. Drawing on the latest neuroscientific data and philosophical theories, he provides an empirical-epistemic definition of the brain. Northoff reveals the basic conceptual confusion about the relationship between mind and brain that has so obstinately been lingering in both neuroscience and philosophy. He subsequently develops an alternative framework where the integration of the brain within body and environment is central. This novel approach plunges the reader into the depths of our own brain. The "Philosophy of the Brain" that emerges opens the door to a fascinating world of new findings that explore the mind and its relationship to our very human brain. (Series A).