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| Nota di contenuto       | Preface: A test case of collective security -- Introduction: The nature of the problem -- Part 1: Background of the Munich crisis. The shaky foundations of collective security: Moscow, Paris, London ; Soviet-Romanian relations I: 1934-1938 ; Soviet-Romanian relations II: summer 1938 -- Part 2: Foreground: Climax of the crisis. East awaiting west: Berchtesgaden to Godesberg ; The red army mobilizes ; Denouement -- Part 3: Conclusion. What the red army actually did ; What the red army might feasibly have done ; Epilogue ; Assessment of soviet intentions. |
| Sommario/riassunto      | The Munich crisis is everywhere acknowledged as the prelude to World War II. If Hitler had been stopped at Munich then World War II as we know it could not have happened. The subject has been thoroughly   |

studied in British, French and German documents and consequently we know that the weakness in the Western position at Munich consisted in the Anglo-French opinion that the Soviet commitment to its allies - France and Czechoslovakia - was utterly unreliable. What has never been seriously studied in the Western literature is the whole spectrum of East European documentation. This book targets precisely this dimension of the problem. The Romanians were at one time prepared to admit the transfer of the Red Army across their territory. The Red Army, mobilised on a massive scale, was informed that its destination was Czechoslovakia. The Polish consul in Lodavia reported the entrance of the Red Army into the country. In the meantime, Moscow focused especially on the Polish rail network. All of these findings are new, and they contribute to a considerable shift in the conventional wisdom on the subject.

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