

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910964518303321
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Titolo	Moral skepticisms / / Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 2006
ISBN	0-19-988488-9 0-19-518772-5 1-4356-1847-5 9786611162641 1-281-16264-7 0-19-804061-X
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (286 p.)
Disciplina	171/.2
Soggetti	Ethics Skepticism
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references (p. 253-262) and index.
Nota di contenuto	Contents; PART I: ISSUES; Chapter 1. What Is Moral Epistemology?; Chapter 2. Are Moral Beliefs Truth-Apt?; Chapter 3. Are Any Moral Beliefs True?; Chapter 4. Are Any Moral Beliefs Justified?; Chapter 5. In Contrast with What?; Chapter 6. Classy Moral Pyrrhonism; PART II: THEORIES; Chapter 7. Naturalism; Chapter 8. Normativism; Chapter 9. Intuitionism; Chapter 10. Coherentism; References; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; Q; R; S; T; U; V; W; Z
Sommario/riassunto	Sinnott-Armstrong here provides an extensive survey of the difficult subject of moral beliefs. He covers theories that grapple with questions of morality such as naturalism, normativism, intuitionism, and coherentism. He then defends his own theory that he calls ""moderate moral skepticism,"" which is that moral beliefs can be justified, but not extremely justified.