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5.3 Efficient Mechanisms; 5.3.1 The VCG Mechanism; 5.3.2 Budget Balance; 5.3.3 An Application to Bilateral Trade; Chapter 6. Auctions with Interdependent Values; 6.1 The Symmetric Model; 6.2 Second-Price Auctions; 6.3 English Auctions; 6.4 First-Price Auctions; 6.5 Revenue Comparisons; 6.5.1 English versus Second-Price Auctions; 6.5.2 Second-Price versus First-Price Auctions; 6.6 Efficiency; Chapter 7. The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle; 7.1 The Main Result; 7.2 Public Information; 7.3 An Alternative Linkage Principle
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 11.1 Collusion in Second-Price Auctions 11.1.1 Efficient Collusion; 11.1.2 Reserve Prices in the Face of Collusion; 11.2 Collusion in First-Price Auctions; Part II: Multiple-Object Auctions; Chapter 12. An Introduction to Multiple-Object Auctions; 12.1 Sealed-Bid Auctions for Selling Identical Units; 12.1.1 Discriminatory Auctions; 12.1.2 Uniform-Price Auctions; 12.1.3 Vickrey Auctions; 12.2 Some Open Auctions; 12.2.1 Dutch Auctions; 12.2.2 English Auctions; 12.2.3 Ausubel Auctions; Chapter 13. Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values; 13.1 The Basic Model; 13.2 Vickrey Auctions
 13.3 Efficiency in Multiunit Auctions

Sommario/riassunto

Vijay Krishna's 2e of Auction Theory improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna's ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves

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Sommario/riassunto	Knowledge and Reality brings together a selection of Colin McGinn's philosophical essays from the 1970s to the 1990s taking as its theme the relationship between the mind and the world.