

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910973702303321
Autore	Zimmerman Joseph Francis <1928->
Titolo	Congress : facilitator of state action / / Joseph F. Zimmerman
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Albany, : State University of New York Press, c2010
ISBN	9781438429694 143842969X 9781441638878 1441638873
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (250 p.)
Disciplina	320.473/049
Soggetti	Federal government - United States Interstate relations - United States State governments - United States
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto	The federal system -- Devolution of power -- Facilitation of state criminal law enforcement -- Congressional financial assistance -- Facilitation of interstate compact formation -- State-friendly congressional statutes -- Congressional facilitation of state action.
Sommario/riassunto	Reassessing the relationship between the federal government and the states, Congress: Facilitator of State Action examines how the U.S. Congress routinely and necessarily devolves power to the states. A host of congressional statutes reveal the ways in which the U.S. Congress facilitates state action to solve certain problems, including the enforcement of respective criminal laws. Financial and nonfinancial assistance to the states are elucidated and assessed, including technical assistance and the establishment of such programs as the National Driver Register. Comprehensive and timely, this book illuminates a key dynamic in the country's political system and offers a more complex and accurate theory of federalism. Joseph F. Zimmerman is Professor of Political Science at the University at Albany, State University of New York. His many books include Contemporary American Federalism: The Growth of National Power, Second Edition; The Silence of Congress: State Taxation of Interstate Commerce; and

2. Record Nr.	UNINA9910956791803321
Autore	Sole Juan
Titolo	Lending Resumption After Default : : Lessons from Capital Markets During the 19th Century / / Juan Sole
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
ISBN	9786613820938 9781462321551 1462321550 9781452758213 1452758212 9781282447288 1282447289 9781451987171 145198717X
Edizione	[1st ed.]
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (28 p.)
Collana	IMF Working Papers
Soggetti	Debts, Public Default (Finance) Banks Capital market Consumption Credit Depository Institutions Economics Environment Environmental Economics Environmental economics Environmental Economics: General Environmental sciences Finance Finance: General General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) Industries: Financial Services International capital markets Loans

Macroeconomics
Macroeconomics: Consumption
Micro Finance Institutions
Monetary economics
Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit:
General
Money and Monetary Policy
Mortgages
Saving
Wealth
Bulgaria

Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	"July 2006".
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references.
Nota di contenuto	""Contents""; ""I. MOTIVATION""; ""II. HISTORICAL EVIDENCE ON DEFAULT AND LENDING RESUMPTION""; ""III. THE ENVIRONMENT""; ""IV. OBSERVABLE TYPES""; ""V. UNOBSERVABLE TYPES""; ""VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS""; ""PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS 3 AND 4 ""; ""REFERENCES""
Sommario/riassunto	This paper mines the experience of capital markets during the 19th century to propose an alternative way of interpreting international default episodes. The standard view is that defaulting on sovereign debt entails exclusion from capital markets. Yet we have observed multiple instances of sovereign debt default in which the reaction of lenders was not the one predicted by the punishment story: in some cases, lending ceased for long periods, but in others it was not interrupted. This paper claims that the reaction of lenders after default stems from the additional knowledge about the borrower that lenders acquire during these episodes. The lending relationship is modeled in a costly state-verification environment in which governments have private information about their investment projects (good or bad). It is shown that, in the event of default, it is worthwhile for lenders to find out more about the type of project, and then interrupt lending only if the project is believed to be a bad one.