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Nota di contenuto	Frontmatter -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgments: -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Can Truth Be an Epistemic Goal? -- 3. The Value of Truth -- 4. Requirements of the Truth Goal -- 5. The Primacy of the Truth Goal -- 6. Alternative Monism -- 7. The Value of Knowledge -- 8. Conclusion -- 9. Appendix: Overcoming the Problem of Epistemic Relativism -- Bibliography
Sommario/riassunto	This book is focused on a problem that has aroused the most controversy in recent epistemological debate, which is whether the truth can or cannot be the fundamental epistemic goal. Traditional epistemology has presupposed the centrality of truth without giving a deeper analysis. To epistemic value pluralists, the claim that truth is the fundamental value seems unjustified. Their central judgement is that we can be in a situation where we do not attain truth but something else that is also epistemically valuable. In contrast, epistemic value monists are committed to the view that one can only