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Sommario/riassunto

In 1964 Britain's defence presence in Malaysia and Singapore was the largest and most expensive component of the country's world-wide role. Yet within three and a half years the Wilson Government had announced that Britain would be withdrawing from its major Southeast Asian bases and abandoning any special military role 'East of Suez'. Drawing upon previously classified government records P.L. Pham examines and explains how the Wilson Government came to this conclusion, one of the most significant decisions in the decline of British global power after the Second World War. Substantially revising
