

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910956054703321
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Titolo	In Good Times Prepare for Crisis : From the Great Depression to the Great Recession: Sovereign Debt Crises and Their Resolution // Ira W. Lieberman
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Washington, D.C. : , : Brookings Institution Press, , [2018] New York : , : Bloomsbury Publishing (US), , 2018
ISBN	0-8157-5137-0 0-8157-3546-4
Edizione	[1st ed.]
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (554 pages)
Disciplina	338.5/42
Soggetti	Financial crises Debts, Public Debts, External International economic relations Financial crises - History - 20th century International economic relations - History - 20th century Debts, External - History - 20th century Debts, Public - History - 20th century BUSINESS & ECONOMICS - Economic Conditions History
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto	Historical context: the export of capital, 1815-1914 -- External financing during the interwar period and the Great Depression, 1919-39 -- Private market lending -- Debt service disruptions -- International relations and interwar external sovereign debts -- External sovereign debt, syndicated bank loans, and sovereign debt and crises in developing countries, 1955-94 -- Flow of external capital to the developing world after World War II, 1955-73 -- From petrodollar recycling to debt recycling, syndicated bank loans, and sovereign crises, 1974-83 -- Debt service disruption and bank restructurings -- Debt restructuring and international relations -- Globalization,

financial sector liberalization, and emerging market crises, 1990-2005
-- Globalization, financial sector liberalization, and the flow of capital to emerging markets [TK] -- The emerging market crises and the mexican crisis, 1994-97 -- The East Asian crisis, 1997-2003 -- Korea and crisis resolution, 1997-2003 -- The Turkish crisis, 2001-05 -- The argentine crisis, 2001-04 -- The Great Recession and crises in the advanced economies -- Crises in the advanced economies and the Japanese crisis as a precursor -- U.S. crisis-causes of the crisis, 2007-12 -- Ad hoc interventions before the Lehman collapse -- A systemic approach to crisis resolution after the Lehman collapse -- The great recession-from financial to economic crisis -- The eurozone crisis, 2008-15 -- The eurozone crisis-from banking crises, to sovereign crises, to bailouts -- Conclusion-are we prepared for the next one? -- Appendices -- A. A comparative overview of debt-crisis regimes : from the great depressions through the great -- Recessions -- B. Commercial bank debt restructurings with sovereign debtors, 1980-89 -- Notes.

Sommario/riassunto

Sovereign debt crises are a little like the weather: One can get ready to endure them and maybe take some steps to lessen their impact, but so far it hasn't been possible to prevent them. Like the weather, they just keep happening. That's the overriding thesis of this book tracing the major debt crises of the past century, starting with the Great Depression and running through the recent Great Recession. Written by a former World Bank expert on debt crises, this book discusses best practices for how such crises can be resolved. As the painful experience of the past decade reminded everyone, frequent debt crises and defaults do great damage to economies and cause vast personal hardship. But resolving them has proven difficult--both economically and politically--and has taken time, almost always requiring a lender of last resort such as a country's central bank or the International Monetary Fund. Too often, efforts to end debt crises have been little more than a palliative, and the debt overhang from one crisis contributes to the next, as illustrated by the ongoing saga in Greece. Both private and sovereign debts have increased substantially since the 2008 crisis, with inadequate deleveraging. This debt overhang leaves countries vulnerable and with limited maneuverability to address the next crisis. This book does not pretend to describe how debt crises can be prevented. But it does draw useful lessons from recent crises that can help economists, bankers, policymakers, and others resolve the inevitable future crises with the least possible damage.