

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910838309103321
Autore	Bussolo Maurizio
Titolo	Hidden Potential : Rethinking Informality in South Asia
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Washington, D. C. : , : World Bank Publications, , 2023 ©2022
ISBN	1-4648-1836-3
Edizione	[1st ed.]
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (355 pages)
Collana	South Asia Development Forum
Altri autori (Persone)	SharmaSiddharth
Disciplina	330
Soggetti	Informal sector (Economics) Informal sector (Economics) - Taxation - South Asia Informal sector (Economics) - South Asia
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Sommario/riassunto	<p>Informality remains widespread in South Asia despite decades of economic growth. The low earnings and high vulnerability in the informal sector make this a major development issue for the region. Yet, there is no consensus on its causes and consequences, with the debate polarized between a view that informality is a problem of regulatory evasion and should be eradicated, and another that equates informality with economic exclusion. Recent advances in analyzing informality as the outcome of firm dynamics in distorted economic environments can help reconcile them. Building on these advances, the approach adopted in this volume clarifies that there are different types of informality, with different drivers and consequences. The report has four main messages that underscore the need for a multipronged strategy. First, informality in South Asia is dominated by firms that happen to be outside the purview of regulations because they are small, as opposed to those that remain small to escape regulations. Second, reforms of business regulations tend to have small direct effects on the informal sector, although they could have sizable indirect impacts on it if they succeed in removing major inefficiencies in the broader economy. Third, e-commerce platforms offer new opportunities to informal firms and workers, but many of them lack</p>

complementary skills or credit to benefit from such technologies. Fourth, a combination of contributory and non-contributory programs recognizing the heterogeneous saving capacities of informal workers may be necessary to achieve more universal coverage of social insurance.

2. Record Nr.	UNINA9910162925803321
Autore	Forni Lorenzo
Titolo	Fiscal Rules to Tame the Political Budget Cycle : : Evidence from Italian Municipalities / / Lorenzo Forni, Andrea Bonfatti
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2017
ISBN	9781475569988 147556998X 9781475570151 1475570155
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (21 pages) : illustrations, tables
Collana	IMF Working Papers
Altri autori (Persone)	BonfattiAndrea
Disciplina	320
Soggetti	Political science Budgeting Macroeconomics Public Finance Demography Single Equation Models Single Variables: Cross-Sectional Models Spatial Models Treatment Effect Models 'Panel Data Models Spatio-temporal Models' National Deficit Surplus State and Local Budget and Expenditures Intergovernmental Relations Federalism Secession Fiscal Policy National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures Other Public Investment and Capital Stock National Budget Budget Systems

Demographic Economics: General
Economics of the Elderly
Economics of the Handicapped
Non-labor Market Discrimination
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
Public finance & taxation
Budgeting & financial management
Population & demography
Fiscal rules
Capital spending
Budget planning and preparation
Population and demographics
Aging
Fiscal policy
Expenditure
Public financial management (PFM)
Current spending
Capital investments
Budget
Population
Population aging
Expenditures, Public
Panel Data Models
Spatio-temporal Models
Italy

Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references.
Sommario/riassunto	<p>The paper provides evidence that fiscal rules can limit the political budget cycle. It focuses on the application of the Italian fiscal rule at the sub-national level over the period 2004-2006 and shows that: 1) municipalities are subject to political budget cycles in capital spending; 2) the Italian subnational fiscal rule introduced in 1999 has been enforced by the central government; 3) municipalities subject to the fiscal rule show more limited political budget cycles than municipalities not subject to the rule. In order to identify the effect, we rely on the fact that the domestic fiscal rule does not apply to municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants. We find that the political budget cycle increases real capital spending by about 35 percent on average in the years prior to municipal elections and that the sub-national fiscal rule reduces these figures by about two thirds.</p>
