Record Nr.	UNINA9910828830303321
Autore	Xenos Dimitris
Titolo	The positive obligations of the state under the European Convention of Human Rights / / Dimitris Xenos
Pubbl/distr/stampa	New York, : Routledge, 2012
ISBN	1-136-66443-2 1-280-66062-7 9786613637550 0-203-80781-2 1-136-66444-0
Edizione	[1st ed.]
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (266 p.)
Collana	Routledge research in human rights law
Disciplina	341.4/8094
Soggetti	Human rights - Europe
	International and municipal law - Europe
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto	Front Cover; The Positive Obligations of the State under the European Convention of Human Rights; Copyright Page; Contents; Table of Cases; Table of Legal instruments; Foreword; Preface; List of abbreviations; 1. The working base; 1.1 What's right and what's wrong with positive obligations; 1.2 Overview of chapters; 1.3 Basic issues of context and subject matter; 1.3.1 The distinctiveness of human rights; 1.3.2 International responsibility and the general scope of human rights protection; 1.3.2.1 Article 1; 1.3.2.2 Title 1.3.3 The nature and structure of the Convention rights: the centrality of private life/personality as a core value1.3.4 The object and purpose of the Convention; 1.4 The doctrinal justification of positive obligations; 1.4.1 Early studies; 1.4.2 The first positive obligations cases; 1.4.2.1 X and Y; 1.4.2.2 Marchx; 1.4.2.3 Airey; 1.4.3 Subsequent studies; 1.4.3.1 The horizontality issue: forced or dangerous?; 1.4.4 The substantive debate: the co(i)nstitutional guarantees; 1.4.4.1 The national constitutional debate; 1.4.2 The drittwirkung proposal 1.4.4.3 The international debate: international responses to international phemomena1.5 The on-going debate: re-evaluating the

1.

	subsidiary function of the court; 2. The application and development of positive obligations; 2.1 Establishing the distinctive nature and potential of positive obligations in the current reasoned phase of the jurisprudence; 2.1.1 The merging of positive and negative obligations: the fair balance test; 2.1.2 The proposal to determine positive obligations under the paragraph 2 provisions; 2.1.3 The stages before the balance test 2.1.4 A firm distinction between positive and negative obligations2.1.5 The perspective of human rights protection: the rule or the exception - the contextual or the ad hoc response?; 2.2 The wider and common justification of the state's obligations: the critical element of knowledge of the need of human rights; 2.2.1.1 Express knowledge from direct interference with known results; 2.2.1.2 Implied knowledge from incidental interference withknown or predictable results 2.2.1.3 Express or implied knowledge from express complaints; 2.2.1.5 Express knowledge from previous decisions of non-justifiability of the interference; 2.2.2 The element of knowledge in positive obligations cases; 2.2.2.1 Implied knowledge from previous incidents or comparative examples; 2.2.2.3 Express knowledge from previous incidents or comparative examples; 2.2.2.3 Express knowledge from previous incidents or comparative examples; 2.2.2.3 Express knowledge from previous incidents or comparative examples; 2.2.2.3 Express knowledge from express complaints; 2.2.3 The autonomy of the element of knowledge an identifiable threat; 2.2.4 Express knowledge from express complaints; 2.2.3 The outonmy of the element of knowledge 2.3 The content of positive obligations under paragraph 1 of the Convention rights
Sommario/riassunto	The system of the European Convention of Human Rights imposes positive obligations on the state to guarantee human rights in circumstances where state agents dot not directly interfere. In addition to the traditional/liberal negative obligation of non-interference, the state must actively protect the human rights of individuals residing within its jurisdiction. The liability of the state in terms of positive obligations induces a freestanding imperative of human rights that changes fundamentally the perception of the role of the state and the participatory ability of the individual, who can