1. Record Nr. UNINA9910828330103321 Autore Gert Joshua Titolo Brute rationality: normativity and human action // Joshua Gert Cambridge;; New York,: Cambridge, 2004 Pubbl/distr/stampa **ISBN** 1-107-14913-4 1-280-51612-7 0-511-21479-0 0-511-21658-0 0-511-21121-X 0-511-31536-8 0-511-48708-8 0-511-21298-4 Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (xiii, 230 pages) : digital, PDF file(s) Collana Cambridge studies in philosophy Disciplina 128/.4 Soggetti Normativity (Ethics) Decision making - Moral and ethical aspects Lingua di pubblicazione Inglese **Formato** Materiale a stampa Livello bibliografico Monografia Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). Note generali Nota di bibliografia Includes bibliographical references (p. 221-225) and index. Nota di contenuto What would an adequate theory of rationality be like? -- Practical rationality, morality, and purely justificatory reasons -- The criticism from internalism about practical reasons -- A functional role analysis of reasons -- Accounting for our actual normative judgments -- Fitting the view into the contemporary debate -- Two concepts of rationality -- Internalism and different kinds of reasons -- Brute rationality. Sommario/riassunto This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favour of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of the agent's attitude. It also explains why the class of rationally permissible action is wide enough to contain not only all morally required action,

but also much selfish and immoral action. The book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally.