1.	Record Nr.	UNINA9910826823303321
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	Titolo	Blind oracles : intellectuals and war from Kennan to Kissinger / / Bruce Kuklick
	Pubbl/distr/stampa	Princeton, New Jersey : , : Princeton University Press, , [2006] ©2006
	ISBN	0-691-12349-7 1-4008-4946-2
	Edizione	[Course Book]
	Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (258 p.)
	Classificazione	15.85
	Disciplina	327.73
	Soggetti	Intellectuals - Political activity - United States - History - 20th century United States Foreign relations 1945-1989 Decision making
	Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
	Formato	Materiale a stampa
	Livello bibliografico	Monografia
	Note generali	Description based upon print version of record.
	Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
	Nota di contenuto	The social rule of the man of knowledge Scientific management and war, 1910-1960 Theorists of war, 1945-1953 RAND in opposition, 1946-1961 Accented and unaccented realism, 1946-1961 RAND and the Kennedy administration, 1961-1962 Cuba and Nassau, 1962 Intellectuals in power, 1961-1966 The Kennedy school of government, 1964-1971 The Pentagon papers Henry Kissinger Diplomats on foreign policy, 1976-2001.
	Sommario/riassunto	In this trenchant analysis, historian Bruce Kuklick examines the role of intellectuals in foreign policymaking. He recounts the history of the development of ideas about strategy and foreign policy during a critical period in American history: the era of the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. The book looks at how the country's foremost thinkers advanced their ideas during this time of United States expansionism, a period that culminated in the Vietnam War and détente with the Soviets. Beginning with George Kennan after World War II, and concluding with Henry Kissinger and the Vietnam War, Kuklick examines the role of both institutional policymakers such as those at The Rand Corporation and Harvard's Kennedy School, and individual thinkers including Paul Nitze, McGeorge Bundy, and Walt Rostow. Kuklick contends that the figures having the most influence on

American strategy--Kissinger, for example--clearly understood the way politics and the exercise of power affects policymaking. Other brilliant thinkers, on the other hand, often played a minor role, providing, at best, a rationale for policies adopted for political reasons. At a time when the role of the neoconservatives' influence over American foreign policy is a subject of intense debate, this book offers important insight into the function of intellectuals in foreign policymaking.