

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910826125403321
Titolo	Classifying reality // edited by David S. Oderberg
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Hoboken, : Wiley-Blackwell, 2013
ISBN	9781118627747 1118627741 9781118508336 1118508335 9781299277564 129927756X 9781118508343 1118508343
Edizione	[1st ed.]
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (140 p.)
Collana	Ratio Special Issues
Altri autori (Persone)	OderbergDavid S
Disciplina	001.01/2
Soggetti	Reality Classification Categories (Philosophy) Science - Philosophy
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto	Categorical predication / E.J. Lowe -- Nature's joints: a realistic defence of natural properties / D.H. Mellor -- Boundaries in reality / Tuomas E. Tahko -- Contrastive explanations in evolutionary biology / Stephen Boulter -- Animate beings: their nature and identity / Gary S. Rosenkrantz -- Classifying processes: an essay in applied ontology / Barry Smith.
Sommario/riassunto	Distinguished metaphysicians examine issues central to the high-profile debate between philosophers over how to classify the natural world, and discuss issues in applied ontology such as the classification of diseases. Leading metaphysicians explore fundamental questions related to the classification and structure of the natural world An essential commentary on issues at the heart of the contemporary debate between philosophy and science Interweaves discussion of

2. Record Nr.	UNINA9910261146503321
Autore	Peter Indefrey
Titolo	Accessing Conceptual Representations for Speaking
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Frontiers Media SA, 2016
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (141 p.)
Collana	Frontiers Research Topics
Soggetti	Psychology
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Sommario/riassunto	<p>For speaking, words in the lexicon are somehow activated from conceptual representations but we know surprisingly little about how this works precisely. Which of the attributes of the concept DOG (e.g. BARKS, IS WALKED WITH A LEASH, CARNIVORE, ANIMATE) have to be activated in a given situation to be able to select the word 'dog'? Are there things we know about dogs that are always activated for naming and others that are only activated in certain contexts or even never? To date, investigations on lexical access in speaking have largely focused on the effects of distractor nouns on the naming latency of a target noun. We have learned that distractors from the same semantic category (e.g. 'cat') hinder naming, but associatively related distractors ('leash') may facilitate or hinder naming. However, associatively related words can have all kinds of semantic relationships to a target word, and, with few exceptions, the effects of specific semantic relationships other than membership in the same category as the target concept have not been systematically investigated. This special issue aims at moving forward towards a more detailed account of how precisely conceptual information is used to access the lexicon in speaking and what corresponding format of conceptual representations needs to be assumed.</p>

