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Collana	Central problems of philosophy
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Nota di contenuto	Cover; Half Title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Preface; Introduction: Truth lost?; 1 Classical theories of truth; 1.1 A preliminary map; 1.2 Correspondence; 1.3 Coherence; 1.4 Verificationism; 1.5 Pragmatism; 1.6 The identity theory; 2 Deflationism; 2.1 Varieties of deflationism; 2.2 Redundancy and disquotation; 2.3 Tarski's semantic theory; 2.4 Horwich's deflationist minimalism; 2.5 The false modesty of deflationism; 2.6 Rorty, Nietzsche and Heidegger; 3 Minimal realism; 3.1 Wright's minimal anti-realism; 3.2 Putnam's ""natural realism""; 3.3 Truth and truth-aptness 3.4 Minimal realism stated 3.5 Minimal realism and the norm of knowledge; 4 The realist/anti-realist controversies; 4.1 Theoretical truths in science; 4.2 Truth in ethics; 4.3 Mathematical truth; 4.4 Realism vindicated; 5 The norm of truth; 5.1 Truth and normativity; 5.2 The ethics of belief; 5.3 Cognitive suicide; 5.4 What's wrong with relativism; Conclusion: Truth regained; Notes; Bibliography; Index
Sommario/riassunto	In this critical introduction to contemporary philosophical issues in the theory of truth Pascal Engel provides clear and authoritative exposition of recent and current ideas while providing original perspectives that advances discussion of the key issues. The book begins with a

presentation of the classical conceptions of truth the correspondence theory, the coherence theory and verificationist and pragmatist accounts before examining so-called "minimalist" and "deflationist" conceptions that deny truth can be anything more than a thin concept holding no metaphysical weight. The debates between those who favour "substantive" conceptions of the classical kind and those who advocate minimalist and deflationist conceptions are explored. Engel argues that, although the minimalist conception of truth is basically right, it does not follow that truth can be eliminated from our philosophical thinking as some upholders of radical deflationist views have claimed. Questions about truth and realism are examined and the author shows how the realism/anti-realism debate remains a genuine, meaningful issue for a theory of truth and has not been undermined by deflationist views. Even if a metaphysical substantive theory of truth has little chance to succeed, Engel concludes, truth can keep a central role within our thinking, as a norm or guiding value of our rational inquiries and practices, in the philosophy of knowledge and in ethics.
