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Sommario/riassunto

Can the G-20 become a steering committee for the world's economy? Launched at a moment of panic triggered by the financial crisis in late 2008, the leaders' level G-20 is trying to evolve from crisis committee for the world economy to a real steering group facilitating international economic cooperation. What can and should such a ""steering committee"" focus on? How important could the concrete gains from cooperation be? How much faster could world growth be? Is there sufficient legitimacy in the G-20 process? How does the G-20 relate to the IMF and the World Bank? How can Australia in 2015,

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Coercion, survival, and war : why weak states resist the United States / / Phil Haun

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Sommario/riassunto

In asymmetric interstate conflicts, great powers have the capability to coerce weak states by threatening their survival—but not vice versa. It is therefore the great power that decides whether to escalate a conflict into a crisis by adopting a coercive strategy. In practice, however, the coercive strategies of the U.S. have frequently failed. In *Coercion, Survival and War* Phil Haun chronicles 30 asymmetric interstate crises involving the US from 1918 to 2003. The U.S. chose coercive strategies in 23 of these cases, but coercion failed half of the time: most often because the more powerful U.S. made demands that threatened the very survival of the weak state, causing it to resist as long as it had the means to do so. It is an unfortunate paradox Haun notes that, where the U.S. may prefer brute force to coercion, these power asymmetries may well lead it to first attempt coercive strategies that are expected to fail in order to justify the war it desires. He concludes that, when coercion is preferred to brute force there are clear limits as to what can be demanded. In such cases, he suggests, U.S. policymakers can improve the chances of success by matching appropriate threats to demands, by including other great powers in the coercive process, and by reducing a weak state leader's reputational costs by giving him or her face-saving options.