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Nota di contenuto	Evaluating the British approach to counter-insurgency since 1948 -- The blueprint : Malaya, 1948-60 -- The transfer : Kenya, 1952-60 -- The turning point : Aden & South Arabia, 1962-67 -- The nadir : Northern Ireland, 1969-1979 -- The culmination? : Iraq, 2003-2009 -- Puncturing the counter-insurgency myth : Britain and irregular warfare in the past, present and future.
Sommario/riassunto	This book examines the complex practice of counter-insurgency warfare through the prism of British military experiences in the post-war era and endeavours to unpack their performance. During the

twentieth century counter-insurgency assumed the status of one of the British military's fortes. A wealth of asymmetric warfare experience was accumulated after the Second World War as the small wars of decolonisation offered the army of a fading imperial power many opportunities to deploy against an irregular enemy. However, this quantity of experience does not translate into quality. This b
