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Sommario/riassunto	Dualism argues that the mind is more than just the brain. It holds that there exists two very different realms, one mental and the other physical. Both are fundamental and one cannot be reduced to the other - there are minds and there is a physical world. This book examines

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and defends the most famous dualist account of the mind, the cartesian, which attributes the immaterial contents of the mind to an immaterial self.John Foster's new book exposes the inadequacies of the dominant materialist and reductionist accounts of the mind. In doing so he is in radical conflict with the current phil