

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910821871003321
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Titolo	Principled agents? : the political economy of good government // Timothy Besley
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 2006
ISBN	0191533920 9780191533921
Descrizione fisica	xi, 266 p. : ill
Collana	The Lindahl lectures
Disciplina	352.3
Soggetti	Public administration Government productivity Agent (Philosophy) - Political aspects Motivation (Psychology) - Political aspects Policy sciences
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references (p. 234-247) and index.
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Sommario/riassunto

Mainstream policy economics now pays more attention to the delivery of policy outcomes and how incentives and institutional change shape the effectiveness of government. But should these issues be studied against a background of purely self-interested public servants? There is plenty of evidence that many citizens are publicly spirited. Can their motivation be harnessed in the public interest? These lectures review how economic thought on these issues has evolved.
