Record Nr. UNINA9910819702803321 Autore Bunge Mario <1919-> Titolo Chasing reality: strife over realism / / Mario Bunge Pubbl/distr/stampa Toronto, [Ontario];; Buffalo, [New York];; London, [England]:,: University of Toronto Press., 2006 ©2006 **ISBN** 1-281-99189-9 9786611991890 1-4426-7285-4 Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (357 p.) Collana Toronto Studies in Philosophy 149.2 Disciplina Soggetti Realism Lingua di pubblicazione Inglese **Formato** Materiale a stampa Livello bibliografico Monografia Description based upon print version of record. Note generali Nota di bibliografia Includes bibliographical references and indexes. Nota di contenuto Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- 1. Reality and Hylorealism -- 2. Phenomena, Phenomenalism, and Science -- 3. Antirealism Today: Positivism, Phenomenology, Constructivism -- 4. Causation and Chance: Apparent or Real? -- 5. Behind Screens: Mechanisms -- 6. From Z to A: Inverse Problems -- 7. Bridging Fact and Theory -- 8. To Reality through Fiction -- 9. Transcendentals Are Of This World -- 10. From Plato's Cave to Galileo's Hill: Realism Vindicated -- Appendix: Fact and Pattern -- References -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects Sommario/riassunto Chasing Reality deals with the controversies over the reality of the external world. Distinguished philosopher Mario Bunge offers an extended defence of realism, a critique of various forms of contemporary anti-realism, and a sketch of his own version of realism, namely hylorealism. Bunge examines the main varieties of antirealism -Berkeley's, Hume's, and Kant's; positivism, phenomenology, and constructivism - and argues that all of these in fact hinder scientific research. Bunge's realist contention is that genuine explanations in the sciences appeal to causal laws and mechanisms that are not directly observable, rather than simply to empirical generalisations. Genuine

science, in his view, is objective even when it deals with subjective

phenomena such as feelings of fear. This work defends a realist view of universals, kinds, possibilities, and dispositions, while rejecting contemporary accounts of these that are couched in terms of modal logic and 'possible worlds.'