Record Nr. UNINA9910819666003321 Autore Payne Keith B. Titolo The fallacies of Cold War deterrence and a new direction / / Keith B. Payne Pubbl/distr/stampa Lexington, Kentucky:,: The University Press of Kentucky,, 2001 ©2001 **ISBN** 0-8131-2775-0 0-8131-4849-9 Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (240 p.) Disciplina 355.02/17 Soggetti Deterrence (Strategy) Nuclear weapons - United States Cold War Deterrence (Strategy) - History - 20th century United States Military policy Lingua di pubblicazione Inglese **Formato** Materiale a stampa Livello bibliografico Monografia Note generali Description based upon print version of record. Nota di bibliografia Includes bibliographical references and index. Nota di contenuto Cold War deterrence theory and practice -- Why the Cold War deterrence framework is inadequate -- Cold War deterrence thought in the post-Cold War world -- The dilemma of popular usage and a new direction -- Testing the deterrence framework -- The new deterrence framework, evidence, and misplaced confidence -- Lessons of this case study. In 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain hoped that a policy of Sommario/riassunto appeasement would satisfy Adolf Hitler's territorial appetite and structured British policy accordingly. This plan was a failure, chiefly because Hitler was not a statesman who would ultimately conform to familiar norms. Chamberlain's policy was doomed because he had greatly misjudged Hitler's basic beliefs and thus his behavior. U.S. Cold War nuclear deterrence policy was similarly based on the confident but questionable assumption that Soviet leaders would be rational by

Washington's standards; they would behave reasonably wh