1. Record Nr. UNINA9910819006603321 Autore Broome John <1947-> Titolo Rationality through reasoning / / John Broome Pubbl/distr/stampa Chichester, West Sussex, U.K., : Wiley-Blackwell, c2013 **ISBN** 1-118-60909-3 1-118-60908-5 1-118-60910-7 Edizione [1st ed.] Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (324 p.) The Blackwell/Brown Lectures in Philosophy; ; 4 Collana Disciplina 153.4/3 Soggetti Reasoning Practical reason Lingua di pubblicazione Inglese **Formato** Materiale a stampa Livello bibliografico Monografia Note generali Description based upon print version of record. Nota di bibliografia Includes bibliographical references and index. Nota di contenuto Cover; Title page; Copyright page; Contents; Preface; 1: Introduction; 1.1 Motivation; Rationality and reasoning; 1.2 This book; Metaphysics; Notes: 2: Ought; 2.1 The meaning of 'ought'; 2.2 Normative and nonnormative oughts; Natural normativity; 2.3 Owned and unowned oughts; The propositional ought; Unowned oughts; Ownership and agency; Owned oughts are central; Enkrasia and defining the central ought; 2.4 Qualified and unqualified oughts; Requirements; Qualified oughts and the central ought; Notes; 3: Objective, Subjective and Prospective Oughts; 3.1 Sidgwick's View; 3.2 The need to decide

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## Sommario/riassunto

Rationality Through Reasoning answers the question of how people are motivated to do what they believe they ought to do, built on a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality and reasoning that differs significantly from much existing philosophical thinking. Develops an original account of normativity, rationality and reasoning significantly different from the majority of existing philosophical thoughtIncludes an account of theoretical and practical reasoning that explains how reasoning is something we ourselves do, rather than something that happens i