

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910818802103321
Autore	Taylor Alan D
Titolo	Mathematics and Politics : Strategy, Voting, Power and Proof // by Alan D. Taylor
Pubbl/distr/stampa	New York, NY : , : Springer New York : , : Imprint : Springer, , 1995
ISBN	1-4612-2512-4
Edizione	[1st ed. 1995.]
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (XIV, 284 p.)
Collana	Textbooks in Mathematical Sciences, , 1431-9381
Disciplina	519.5
Soggetti	Statistics Economic theory Statistical Theory and Methods Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Statistics for Social Sciences, Humanities, Law
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
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### Sommario/riassunto

interest in a particular application, however, often depends on his or her general interest in the area in which the application is taking place. My experience at Union College has been that there is a real advantage in having students enter the course knowing that virtually all the applications will focus on a single discipline—in this case, political science. The level of presentation assumes no college-level mathematical or social science prerequisites. The philosophy underlying the approach we have taken in this book is based on the sense that we (mathematicians) have tended to make two errors in teaching non-science students: we have overestimated their comfort with computational material, and we have underestimated their ability to handle conceptual material. Thus, while there is very little algebra (and certainly no calculus) in our presentation, we have included numerous logical arguments that students in the humanities and the social sciences will find accessible, but not trivial. The book contains five main topics: a model of escalation, game-theoretic models of international conflict, yes-no voting systems, political power, and social choice. The first part of the text is made up of a single chapter devoted to each topic. The second part of the text revisits each topic, again with a single chapter devoted to each. The organization of the book is based on pedagogical considerations, with the material becoming somewhat more sophisticated as one moves through the ten chapters. On the other hand, within any given chapter there is little reliance on material from earlier chapters, except for those devoted to the same topic.

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