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Nota di contenuto	Frontmatter Contents Introduction Open texture and schematicity as arguments for non-referential semantics Full but not saturated: The myth of mandatory primary pragmatic processes How to get lost in context: Searle on context, content and literal meaning Meaning and interpretation The role of context in semantics: A Relevance Theory perspective Boo semantics: Radical nonfactualism and non truth-conditional meaning Metaphor and mercurial content Context, two-dimensional semantics and conceptual analysis The use of the Binding Argument in the debate about location Slices of meaning: Levels of analysis and the unity of understanding Contributors Index
Sommario/riassunto	What methodological impact does Contextualism have on the philosophy of language? This collection sets out to provide some answers. The authors in this volume question three ultimately connected assumptions of the philosophy of language. The first assumption relates to the predominant status of referential semantics and its power to explain truth-conditional meaning. This assumption has come under attack by the context thesis and a number of papers pursue the question of whether this is justified. The second assumption

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gives priority to assertive sentences when considering language use. The context thesis changes our understanding of language use altogether; possible implications from this methodological shift are addressed in this volume. According to the third assumption, philosophical analysis amounts to nothing more than conceptual analysis. The context thesis risks undermining this project. Whether conceptual analysis can still be defended as a methodological tool is discussed in this volume.