

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910817515503321
Titolo	Discourses of space // edited by Judit Pieldner and Zsuzsanna Ajtony
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Newcastle upon Tyne : , : Cambridge Scholars Publishing, , 2013
ISBN	1-4438-6424-2
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (331 p.)
Disciplina	809/.9332
Soggetti	Space in literature Discourse analysis Space in motion pictures Geographical perception in literature
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references.

2. Record Nr.	UNINA9910964629203321
Autore	Vardy Felix
Titolo	Corruption, Competition, and Contracts : : A Model of Vote Buying // Felix Vardy, John Morgan
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
ISBN	9786613829115 9781462311477 1462311474 9781452738048 1452738041 9781283516662 1283516667 9781451908077 1451908075
Edizione	[1st ed.]
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (23 p.)
Collana	IMF Working Papers
Altri autori (Persone)	MorganJohn
Soggetti	Corruption Competition Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Associations Bureaucracy Clubs Committees Corporate crime Crime Criminology Finance Finance: General Financial markets General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation Public finance & taxation Social Choice Tax incentives Taxation Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General

White-collar crime	
United Kingdom	
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	"January 2006." "IMF Institute."
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references.
Nota di contenuto	""Contents""; ""I. Introduction""; ""II. The Model""; ""III. Variation in Contracts""; ""A. Contracting on Votes""; ""B. Contracting on Outcomes""; ""C. Contracting on Votes and Vote Shares""; ""IV. Related Literature""; ""V. Conclusions""; ""References""
Sommario/riassunto	In the presence of competing interest groups, this paper examines how the form of votebuying contracts affects policy outcomes. We study contracts contingent upon individual votes, policy outcomes, and/or vote shares. Voters either care about their individual votes, or about the policy outcome. We find that vote buying is cheaper when what can be contracted upon coincides with what voters care about. Vote buying becomes extremely costly, or even impossible, when there is no such coincidence. Finally, vote buying is extremely cheap, or even free, when contracts can be contingent upon both individual votes and vote shares.