Record Nr. UNINA9910815802003321 Autore Chouragui Frank Titolo Ambiguity and the absolute: Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty on the question of truth / / Frank Chouraqui New York: ,: Fordham University Press, , 2014 Pubbl/distr/stampa **ISBN** 0-8232-5414-3 0-8232-6111-5 0-8232-5413-5 0-8232-5412-7 Edizione [First edition.] Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (xviii, 304 pages) Collana Perspectives in Continental Philosophy Perspectives in continental philosophy 121 Disciplina Soggetti Absolute, The **Ambiguity** Truth Lingua di pubblicazione Inglese **Formato** Materiale a stampa Livello bibliografico Monografia Nota di bibliografia Includes bibliographical references and index. Nota di contenuto Frontmatter -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- Preface -- Introduction --1 Nietzsche on Self-Differentiation and Genealogy -- 2 The Incorporation of Truth and the Symbiosis of Truth and Life -- 3 The Self-Becoming of the World and the Incompleteness of Being --Transition: Vicious Circles, Virtuous Circles, and Meeting Merleau-Ponty in the Middle -- 4 The Origin of Truth -- 5 Existential Reduction and the Object of Truth -- 6 Merleau-Ponty's "Soft" Ontology of Truth as Falsification -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index Sommario/riassunto Friedrich Nietzsche and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Chouraqui argues, are linked by how they conceive the question of truth. Although both thinkers criticize the traditional concept of truth as objectivity, they both find that rejecting it does not solve the problem. What is it in our natural existence that gave rise to the notion of truth? The answer to that question is threefold. First, Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty both

> propose a genealogy of "truth" in which to exist means to make implicit truth claims. Second, both seek to recover the preobjective ground from which truth as an erroneous concept arose. Finally, this attempt at

recovery leads both thinkers to ontological considerations regarding how we must conceive of a being whose structure allows for the existence of the belief in truth. In conclusion, Chouraqui suggests that both thinkers' investigations of the question of truth lead them to conceive of being as the process of self-falsification by which indeterminate being presents itself as determinate.