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| Autore                  | Rovane Carol A (Carol Anne), <1955->   |
| Titolo                  | The metaphysics and ethics of relativism / / Carol Rovane  |
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| ISBN                    | 0-674-72697-9<br>0-674-72606-5   |
| Descrizione fisica      | 1 online resource (250 p.)   |
| Disciplina              | 149  |
| Soggetti                | Relativity<br>Ethics   |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | Inglese  |
| Formato                 | Materiale a stampa   |
| Livello bibliografico   | Monografia   |
| Note generali           | Description based upon print version of record.  |
| Nota di bibliografia    | Includes bibliographical references and index.   |
| Nota di contenuto       | How to formulate the doctrine of relativism -- Prevailing consensus view: disagreement, relative truth and anti-realism -- Relativism as multimundialism -- Evaluating the doctrine of relativism -- Relativism concerning natural facts -- Relativism concerning moral values.  |
| Sommario/riassunto      | Relativism is a contested doctrine among philosophers, some of whom regard it as neither true nor false but simply incoherent. As Carol Rovane demonstrates in this tour-de-force, the way to defend relativism is not by establishing its truth but by clarifying its content. The Metaphysics and the Ethics of Relativism elaborates a doctrine of relativism that has a consistent logical, metaphysical, and practical significance. Relativism is worth debating, Rovane contends, because it bears directly on the moral choices we make in our lives. Rovane maintains that the most compelling conception of relativism is the "alternative intuition." Alternatives are truths that cannot be embraced together because they are not universal. Something other than logical contradiction excludes them. When this is so, logical relations no longer hold among all truth-value-bearers. Some truths will be irreconcilable between individuals even though they are valid in themselves. The practical consequence is that some forms of interpersonal engagement are confined within definite boundaries, and one has no choice but to view what lies beyond those boundaries with |

"epistemic indifference." In a very real sense, some people inhabit different worlds--true in themselves, but closed off to belief from those who hold irreducibly incompatible truths.

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