1. Record Nr. UNINA9910811653203321

Autore Merrell Floyd <1937->

Titolo Pararealities: the nature of our fictions and how we know them //

Floyd Merrell

Amsterdam;; Philadelphia,: Benjamins, 1983 Pubbl/distr/stampa

1-283-35943-X

9786613359438 90-272-8029-0

Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (182 pages)

Collana Purdue University monographs in Romance languages., 0165-8743::

v. 12

801/.9 Disciplina

ISBN

Soggetti Fictions, Theory of

Reality

Knowledge, Theory of

Lingua di pubblicazione Inglese

Formato Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico Monografia

Description based upon print version of record. Note generali

Nota di bibliografia Includes bibliographical references.

Nota di contenuto PARAREALITIES: THE NATURE OF OUR FICTIONS AND HOW WE KNOW

> THEM; Editorial page; Title page; Table of contents; Foreword; Chapter One; 1.1 POSTULATE I: The Initial Cut in the Flux of Experience Results in an Elemental Negation Whereby That which Is Is Contrasted with That which It Is Not.; 1.2 POSTULATE II: Negation Is Possible Only with Respect to Something.; Chapter Two; 2.0 THEOREM I: Knowing What a Fiction Is Entails Tacit Knowledge of What It Is Not.; 2.1 How the Range

of All Possible Fictions Can Be Made Intelligible

2.2 Conception/Perception-Imagination of Fictions Entails a Fictional Operator 2.3 To Conceive/Perceive-Imagine a Fiction Is to Oscillate between What the ""Real World"" Is and What It Is Not.; 2.4 Fictional Responses Vary with Respect to the Type of Fictional Constructs.; 2.5 On the Nature of the Barrier between Fictions and the ""Real World"";

2.6 Fictional Worlds versus Dream Worlds; Chapter Three; 3.0 THEOREM

II: Knowing What a Fiction Is Entails Knowing Part of the Intrinsic Background of Possibilities.; 3.1 Foundations for a Model of the

Intrinsic Background.

3.2 The Relationship between Language, Images, and Fictions with Respect to the Intrinsic Background.3.3 The Intrinsic Background as an Unlimited Set of Possibilities; 3.4 On the Interface between the Intrinsic Background and the ""Real World.""; 3.5 A Postulated Common Base for Mathematics, Scientific Fictions, and Natural Language Fictions.; Chapter Four; 4.0 THEOREM III: Knowing a Fiction Entails an Initial Split between Knower and Known.; 4.1 Preliminaries; 4.2 The Many Worlds of Fictions; 4.3 The Schizophrenic Self and Its Self-Consuming Fictions 4.4 The Domain of Imaginary Worlds: Jungle or Labyrinth 4.5 Continuity versus Discontinuity; 4.6 The Potential for Imaginary Worlds; 4.7 The Upper Bounds of Imaginary Worlds; Chapter Five; 5.0 THEOREM IV: Knowing a Fiction Begins at the Limits of the/a ""Real World.""; 5.1 Toward a Formal Model of the Upper Bounds Representing the Range of All Possible Fictional Sentences.; Epilogue: Some Speculation Beyond; Appendix I; Appendix II; Appendix III; Notes; References