

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910811171003321
Titolo	Serve the power(s), serve the state : America and Eurasia / / edited by Juan Carlos Garavaglia, Michael J. Braddick and Christian Lamouroux
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Newcastle upon Tyne, [England] : , : Cambridge Scholars Publishing, , 2016 ©2016
ISBN	1-4438-9681-0
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (447 pages)
Disciplina	320.98
Soggetti	Latin America Politics and government To 1830
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references at the end of each chapters.

2. Record Nr.	UNINA9910150339603321
Autore	Wirtz James J. <1958->
Titolo	Understanding intelligence failure : warning, response and deterrence / James J. Wirtz
Pubbl/distr/stampa	New York, N.Y. : , : Routledge, , 2017
ISBN	1-315-67329-0
Edizione	[1st ed.]
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (174 pages)
Collana	Studies in Intelligence
Disciplina	327.12
Soggetti	Intelligence service - Methodology Surprise (Military science) Asymmetric warfare Deterrence (Strategy)
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Includes index.
Nota di contenuto	pt. I. The theory of surprise applied -- pt. II. Surprise and deterrence failure -- pt. III. Avoiding surprise : toward a new intelligence doctrine.
Sommario/riassunto	This collection, comprising key works by James J. Wirtz, explains how different threat perceptions can lead to strategic surprise attack, intelligence failure and the failure of deterrence. This volume adopts a strategist's view of the issue of surprise and intelligence failure by placing these phenomena in the context of conflict between strong and weak actors in world affairs. A two-level theory explains the incentives and perceptions of both parties when significant imbalances of military power exist between potential combatants, and how this situation sets the stage for strategic surprise and intelligence failure to occur. The volume illustrates this theory by applying it to the Kargil Crisis, attacks launched by non-state actors, and by offering a comparison of Pearl Harbor and the September 11, 2001 attacks. It explores the phenomenon of deterrence failure; specifically, how weaker parties in an enduring or nascent conflict come to believe that deterrent threats posed by militarily stronger antagonists will be undermined by various constraints, increasing the attractiveness of utilising surprise attack to achieve their objectives. This work also offers strategies that could mitigate the occurrence of intelligence failure, strategic surprise and

the failure of deterrence. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, security studies and IR in general.
