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| 1. Record Nr. | UNINA9910808059003321 |
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| Titolo | The appeal to the given : a study in epistemology // Jacob Joshua Ross |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | London ; ; New York : , : Routledge , , 2015 |
| ISBN | 1-317-44016-1 1-315-69463-8 1-138-90614-X |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (226 p.) |
| Collana | Routledge Library Editions: Epistemology ; ; Volume 12 |
| Disciplina | 121 |
| Soggetti | Knowledge, Theory of Perception |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | Inglese |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Note generali | First published in 1970. |
| Nota di contenuto | <p>""Cover""; ""Half Title""; ""Title""; ""Copyright""; ""Original Title""; ""Original Copyright""; ""PREFACE""; ""Contents""; ""1: THE GIVEN IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY""; ""I Introductory Remarks""; ""II C. I. Lewis on the Given""; ""III The Appeal to the Given""; ""IV The New Defence""; ""V Reopening the Question""; ""2: THE NAIVE VIEW""; ""I Three Views regarding the Given""; ""II The IET and its Opposition to the other Theories""; ""III The Claim that there is no Given""; ""IV Views of the Given and Theories of Perception""; ""V The Naive View of the Dispute""; ""3: THE GIVEN AS SENSE-DATA""</p> <p>""I Implications of the Naive View""""II The Non-Empirical Nature of the Sense-Datum""; ""III Pointing out Sense-Data""; ""IV The Sense-Datum as a Theoretical Entity""; ""V The Linguistic Theory""; ""VI Concluding Note on Fact, Theory and Language""; ""4: THE GIVEN AS OBJECTS""; ""I Objects and Physical Objects""; ""II The Argument from Illusion""; ""III Common-Sense and Direct Realism""; ""IV The Gap between Sensation and Perceptual Awareness""; ""V Intuition versus Thought""; ""VI Armstrong's Theory""; ""VII Intuition and Direct Experience""; ""VIII The Percept Theory""</p> <p>""IX The Judgment Theory""""X Is there really a Gap?""; ""XI The Non-Empirical Nature of Objects""; ""5: THE GIVEN AS IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE""; ""I The Presentational Continuum""; ""II Bradley on</p> |

Immediate Experience"; "III Some Findings of the Psychologist"; "IV Immediate Experience and the Sensual Continuum"; "6: PROBLEM OR PSEUDO-PROBLEM"; "I Different Concepts of Direct Perception"; "II Ostensible Physical Objects as the Given"; "III Different Meanings"; "IV Cross-Purposes"; "V The Non-Inferentially Present"; "VI That there is a Problem"
"7: MAKING OR FINDING THE FACTS"
"I The Nature of Thought: Correspondence and Coherence"; "II The Given Facts"; "III Does Knowing make a Difference to What is Known?"; "IV Finding or Making"; "V Ayer's View"; "8: THOUGHT AND COGNITION"; "I Different Views of Cognition"; "II The Interpreter View"; "III The Constructor View"; "IV The Spectator View"; "V Concepts of the Mind"; "VI The Relation of these to the Appeal to the Given"; "9: THE REAL ISSUE"; "I Three hints"; "II Ryle's Suggestion"; "III Another Suggestion"; "IV The Clue from Bradley"
"V The Quest for Certainty"
"VI Discrediting the Common-Sense World"; "VII The Role of Thought"; "10: EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF PERCEPTION"; "I Three Approaches to the Philosophy of Perception"; "II Neurology and Perception"; "III The Double-Aspect Theory"; "IV Psychology and Perception"; "V The Complementarity Thesis"; "VI Conclusion"; "11: EPISTEMOLOGY, ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND METAPHYSICS"; "I Epistemology as Analysis"; "II Ayer's View"; "III Chisholm's View"; "IV The Epistemologically Basic"; "V An Analytic Science?"; "VI Concluding Remarks"
"12: COMMON SENSE AND RIVAL ONTOLOGIES"

Sommario/riassunto

Originally published in 1970. This work evaluates the appeal to the sensually given which played an important role in epistemological discussions during the early 20th Century. While many contemporary philosophers regarded this appeal as a mistake, there were still some who defended the notion of the given and even made it the foundation of their views regarding perception. The author here points to several different views concerning the nature of the sensually given and argues that the issue between them is not empirical, as is naturally suggested by what he calls 'the Naive View' of the disp
