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	Autore	Serena Chad C
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Nota di contenuto	Front matter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Acronyms and Abbreviations -- Introduction -- 1. The Nature of the Iraqi Insurgency, Networks, and Organizational Adaptation -- 2. The Iraqi Insurgency—Organizational Inputs -- 3. The Iraqi Insurgency—Organizational Outputs, Learning, and Summary of the Adaptive Cycle -- 4. Seeing Afghanistan, Thinking Iraq—Evaluating and Comparing the Insurgency in Afghanistan -- 5. It Takes More than a Network -- Notes -- References -- Index
Sommario/riassunto	It Takes More than a Network presents a structured investigation of the Iraqi insurgency's capacity for and conduct of organizational adaptation. In particular, it answers the question of why the Iraqi insurgency was seemingly so successful between 2003 and late 2006 and yet nearly totally collapsed by 2008. The book's main argument is that the Iraqi insurgency failed to achieve longer-term organizational goals because many of its organizational strengths were also its organizational weaknesses: these characteristics abetted and then corrupted the Iraqi insurgency's ability to adapt. The book further compares the organizational adaptation of the Iraqi insurgency with the organizational adaptation of the Afghan insurgency. This is done to refine the findings of the Iraq case and to present a more robust analysis of the adaptive cycles of two large and diverse covert networked insurgencies. The book finds that the Afghan insurgency, although still ongoing, has adapted more successfully than the Iraqi insurgency because it has been better able to leverage the strengths and counter the weaknesses of its chosen organizational form.