

1. Record Nr.	UNISALENTO991001388339707536
Autore	Rota, Gian Carlo
Titolo	Studies in algebra and number theory / edited by Gian-Carlo Rota
Pubbl/distr/stampa	New York : Academic Press, 1979
ISBN	0125991533
Descrizione fisica	xi, 369 p. ; 24 cm.
Collana	Advances in mathematics supplementary studies ; 6
Classificazione	AMS 00B15 QA155.2
Disciplina	512
Soggetti	Algebra Collections of articles Number theory
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Includes bibliographies

2. Record Nr.	UNINA9910806106003321
Autore	Hunzeker Michael A.
Titolo	Dying to learn : wartime lessons from the Western Front / / Michael A. Hunzeker [[electronic resource]]
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Ithaca : , : Cornell University Press, , 2021
ISBN	1-5017-5847-0 1-5017-5845-4
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (260 pages)
Collana	Cornell studies in security affairs Cornell scholarship online
Classificazione	NP 4450
Disciplina	355.00904
Soggetti	World War, 1914-1918 - Campaigns - Western Front Military art and science - Europe - History - 20th century Tactics - History - 20th century
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Also issued in print: 2021.
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto	Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Introduction. Wartime Learning -- Chapter 1 Assessment, Command, and Training Theory -- Chapter 2 Learning on the Western Front -- Chapter 3 The German Army on the Western Front -- Chapter 4 The British Army on the Western Front -- Chapter 5 The French Army on the Western Front -- Conclusion Alternative Explanations and Policy Implications -- Notes -- Index
Sommario/riassunto	In 'Dying to Learn,' Michael Hunzeker develops a novel theory to explain how wartime militaries learn. He focuses on the Western Front, which witnessed three great-power armies struggle to cope with deadlock throughout the First World War, as the British, French, and German armies all pursued the same solutions - assault tactics, combined arms, and elastic defense in depth. By the end of the war, only the German army managed to develop and implement a set of revolutionary offensive, defensive, and combined arms doctrines that in hindsight represented the best way to fight. Hunzeker identifies three organizational variables that determine how fighting militaries generate new ideas, distinguish good ones from bad ones, and implement the best of them across the entire organization.

