Record Nr. UNINA9910798408503321 Autore Gross Gerhard Paul <1958-> Titolo The myth and reality of German warfare: operational thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger / / Colonel Gerhard P. Gross, Bundeswehr; edited by Major General David T. Zabecki, USA (Ret.); foreword by Robert M. Citino Lexington, Kentucky: .: The University Press of Kentucky, . 2016 Pubbl/distr/stampa **ISBN** 0-8131-6840-6 0-8131-6838-4 Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (465 pages) Collana Foreign military studies Disciplina 355.401 Military planning - Germany - History - 20th century Soggetti Military planning - Germany - History - 19th century Germany History, Military 20th century Germany History, Military 19th century Lingua di pubblicazione Inglese **Formato** Materiale a stampa Livello bibliografico Monografia Note generali Previously issued in print: 2016. Includes bibliographical references and index. Nota di bibliografia Nota di contenuto Introduction -- Definitions: tactics, operations, strategy -- Factors and constants: space, time, and forces -- The beginnings: planning, mobility, and a system of expedients -- The sword of Damocles: a twofront war -- Bitter awakening: World War I -- Old wine in new wineskins: operational thinking in the Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht between reality and utopia -- Lost victories, or the limits of operational thinking -- Operational thinking in the age of the atom -- Conclusion. Sommario/riassunto In this seminal study, Gerhard P. Gross provides a comprehensive examination of the development and failure of German operational thinking over a period of more than a century. He analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of five different armies, from the midnineteenth century through the early days of NATO. He also offers fresh interpretations of towering figures of German military history.