

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910797873103321
Autore	Haas Gordian
Titolo	Minimal verificationism : on the limits of knowledge / / Gordian Haas
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Boston, [Massachusetts] ; ; Berlin, [Germany] : , : De Gruyter, , 2015 ©2015
ISBN	1-5015-0198-4 1-5015-0200-X
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (224 p.)
Collana	Epistemische Studien, , 2198-1884 ; ; Band 31
Disciplina	121.2
Soggetti	Verification (Empiricism) Logical positivism
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
Nota di contenuto	Front matter -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Figures and Tables -- Introduction: Does This Make Nonsense to You? -- 1 Some Historic Formulations and Their Problems -- 2 More Problems Lie Ahead -- 3 Toward a Solution to the Problems -- 4 Minimal Verificationism -- 5 Fallibilist Theories of Justification -- 6 The Standard Theory of Belief Revision: AGM -- 7 Combining Theories of Justification and Belief Revision: Judas -- 8 Lewis' Semantics for Counterfactuals -- 9 Towards a Verifiability-Friendly Semantics for Counterfactuals -- 10 (Non) Concluding Remarks -- References -- Name Index -- Subject Index
Sommario/riassunto	Verificationism has been a hallmark of logical empiricism. According to this principle, a sentence is insignificant in a certain sense if its truth value cannot be determined. Although logical empiricists strove for decades to develop an adequate principle of verification, they failed to resolve its problems. This led to a general abandonment of the verificationist project in the early 1960's. In the last 50 years, this view has received tremendously bad press. Today it is mostly regarded as an outdated historical concept. Theories that have evolved since the abandonment of verificationism can, however, help overcome some of its key problems. More specifically, an adequate criterion of significance can be derived from a combination of modern theories of justification and belief revision, along with a formal semantics for

counterfactuals. In view of these potential improvements, the abandonment of verificationism appears premature. Half a century following its decline, it might be about time to revisit this disreputable view. The author argues in favor of a weak form of verificationism. This approach could be referred to as minimal verificationism, as it involves a weakening of traditional verificationist principles in various respects while maintaining their core idea.

---