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Titolo	Chances for peace : missed opportunities in the Arab-Israeli conflict // Elie Podeh
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ISBN	1-4773-0561-0
Edizione	[First edition.]
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (424 p.)
Disciplina	956.04
Soggetti	Arab-Israeli conflict Conflict management - Middle East Middle East Politics and government
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto	A story of an opportunity not missed -- The Faysal-Weizmann agreement (1919) -- The peel plan for partition (1937) -- The UN partition plan (1947) -- Israeli-Jordanian negotiations (1946-1951) -- Israel and Syria : the Husni Za'im initiative (1949) -- Israeli-Egyptian relations : the Alpha plan and the Anderson mission (1949-1956) -- Egyptian-Israeli contacts (1965-1966) -- Israel's peace overtures in the post-1967 period -- The Rogers plan (1969) -- The Jarring mission and the Sadat initiative (1971) -- Disengagement agreements with Egypt and Syria (1973-1975) -- The Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty : an opportunity not missed (1979) -- The Arab peace plan and the Reagan plan (September 1982) -- The Israeli-Lebanese peace agreement (May 1983) -- The London agreement (April 1987) -- The Shultz initiative (1988) and the Shamir peace plan (1989) -- The Madrid conference (1991) and the Oslo agreements (1993-2000) -- The Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty (1994) -- Israeli-Syrian negotiations (1991-2000) -- The Camp David summit, the Clinton parameters, and the Taba talks (July 2000-January 2001) -- The Arab peace initiative (2002-2014) -- The US road map (April 2003) -- The Annapolis Conference and Abu Mazen-Olmert talks (2007-2008).
Sommario/riassunto	Drawing on a newly developed theoretical definition of "missed

opportunity,” Chances for Peace uses extensive sources in English, Hebrew, and Arabic to systematically measure the potentiality levels of opportunity across some ninety years of attempted negotiations in the Arab-Israeli conflict. With enlightening revelations that defy conventional wisdom, this study provides a balanced account of the most significant attempts to forge peace, initiated by the world’s superpowers, the Arabs (including the Palestinians), and Israel. From Arab-Zionist negotiations at the end of World War I to the subsequent partition, the aftermath of the 1967 War and the Sadat Initiative, and numerous agreements throughout the 1980s and 1990s, concluding with the Annapolis Conference in 2007 and the Abu Mazen-Olmert talks in 2008, pioneering scholar Elie Podeh uses empirical criteria and diverse secondary sources to assess the protagonists’ roles at more than two dozen key junctures. A resource that brings together historiography, political science, and the practice of peace negotiation, Podeh’s insightful exploration also showcases opportunities that were not missed. Three agreements in particular (Israeli-Egyptian, 1979; Israeli-Lebanese, 1983; and Israeli-Jordanian, 1994) illuminate important variables for forging new paths to successful negotiation. By applying his framework to a broad range of power brokers and time periods, Podeh also sheds light on numerous incidents that contradict official narratives. This unique approach is poised to reshape the realm of conflict resolution.
