Record Nr. UNINA9910797645303321 Autore **Ueda Tomoo** Titolo Telling what she thinks: semantics and pragmatics of propositional attitude reports / / Tomoo Ueda Pubbl/distr/stampa Berlin, [Germany];; Boston, [Massachusetts]:,: De Gruyter,, 2015 ©2015 **ISBN** 3-11-042959-4 3-11-042970-5 Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (186 p.) Collana Epistemische Studien, , 2198-1884; ; Band 33 Disciplina 160 Propositional attitudes Soggetti **Pragmatics** Lingua di pubblicazione Inglese **Formato** Materiale a stampa Livello bibliografico Monografia Description based upon print version of record. Note generali Nota di bibliografia Includes bibliographical references and index. Nota di contenuto Front matter -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables --Acknowledgments -- List of abbreviations -- 1. The central problems -- 2. Structured propositionalism and its shared assumptions -- 3. Indirectness of speech and role of deixis -- 4. Metaphysical status of propositional attitudes -- 5. Communicative framework and discursive opacity -- 6. Opacity as a feature of the frame -- 7. Adverbial account of the frame -- 8. The VarCA Analysis -- 9. Consequences of the opaque VarCA -- 10. Conclusion -- List of sentences -- Bibliography -- Source of linguistic data -- Index Sommario/riassunto Frege's puzzle concerning belief reports has been in the middle of the discussion on semantics and pragmatics of attitude reports: The intuition behind the opacity does not seem to be consistent with the thesis of semantic innocence according to which the semantic value of proper names is nothing but their referent. Main tasks of this book include providing truth-conditional content of belief reports. Especially, the focus is on semantic values of proper names. The key aim is to extend Crimmins's basic idea of semantic pretense and the introduction of pleonastic entities proposed by Schiffer. They enable us

to capture Frege's puzzle in the analysis without giving up semantic innocence. To reach this conclusion, two issues are established. First,

based on linguistic evidence, the frame of belief reports functions adverbially rather than relationally. Second, the belief ascriptions, on which each belief report is made, must be analyzed in terms of the measurement-theoretic analogy.