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Nota di contenuto	Cover Freedom, Fatalism, and Foreknowledge Copyright Contents Acknowledgments List of Contributors Preface Introduction Part I The Arguments for Fatalism 1. Fate 2. Fatalism 3. Truth and Freedom 4. The Truth about Freedom: A Reply to Merricks 5. Fatalism, Incompatibilism, and the Power to Do Otherwise 6. Presentism and Fatalism 7. Compatibilist Options Part II The Problem of Foreknowledge 8. Omniscience and the Arrow of Time 9. Troubles with Ockhamism 10. Presentism and Ockham's Way Out 11. Geachianism 12. On Augustine's Way Out Part III The Logic of Future Contingents 13. The Meaning of "Is Going to Be" 14. It Was to Be 15. Future Contingents and Relative Truth 16. In Defense of Ockhamism Bibliography (compiled by Patrick Todd) Index
Sommario/riassunto	We typically think we have free will. But how could we have free will, if for anything we do, it was already true in the distant past that we would do that thing? Or how could we have free will, if God already knows in advance all the details of our lives? Such issues raise the specter of "fatalism". This book collects sixteen previously published articles on fatalism, truths about the future, and the relationship between divine foreknowledge and human freedom, and includes a substantial

introductory essay and bibliography. Many of the pieces collected here
build bridges between discussions
