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Autore	De Bruin Erica <1982->
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Nota di contenuto	Introduction: Preventing Coups d'etat -- The Logic of Counterbalancing -- Counterbalancing and Coup Failure -- How Counterbalancing Works: Testing the Causal Mechanisms -- An Effective Deterrent? Counterbalancing and Coup Attempts -- Challenges to Building Coercive Institutions -- How Coups d'etat Escalate to Civil War -- Conclusion: Coercive Institutions and Regime Survival.
Sommario/riassunto	When rulers use presidential guards, militarized police, and militia to counterbalance the regular military, efforts to oust them from power via coups d'etat are less likely to succeed. Even as counterbalancing helps to prevent successful interventions, however, the resentment that it generates within the regular military can provoke new coup attempts. And because counterbalancing changes how soldiers and police perceive the costs and benefits of a successful overthrow, it can create incentives for protracted fighting that result in the escalation of a coup into full-blown civil war. Drawing on an original dataset of state security forces in 110 countries over a span of fifty years, as well as case studies of coup attempts in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, the book sheds light on how counterbalancing affects regime survival.

