

1. Record Nr.	UNISA996388655503316
Titolo	By the King. A proclamation conteining the Kings Maiesties pleasure concerning the apprehension of the Greames [[electronic resource]]
Pubbl/distr/stampa	[Imprinted at London, : By Robert Barker, printer to the Kings most excellent Maiestie, Anno Dom. 1614]
Descrizione fisica	[2] sheets
Altri autori (Persone)	James, King of England, <1566-1625.>
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	<p>Caption title.</p> <p>Dated at end: Royston the two and twentieth day of luly, in the twelfth yeere of our raigne ..</p> <p>Imprint from colophon.</p> <p>Reproduction of the original in the Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery.</p>
Sommario/riassunto	eebo-0113

2. Record Nr.	UNINA9910792664103321
Autore	DiLorenzo Thomas J.
Titolo	An Austro-libertarian critique of public choice // Thomas J. DiLorenzo, Walter E. Block
Pubbl/distr/stampa	New York, New York : , : Addleton Academic Publishers, , [2016] ©2016
ISBN	1-935494-98-8
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (344 pages)
Disciplina	323.44
Soggetti	Social choice Libertarianism
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references.
Nota di contenuto	Front Cover -- Half Title -- Editorial Advisory Board -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Part 1: What Is Austrian Economics? -- Chapter 1 The Subjectivist Roots of James Buchanan's Economics -- Chapter 2 Cultural Dynamics -- Part 2: The Austrian Critique of Public Choice -- Chapter 3 Competition and Political Entrepreneurship: Austrian Insights into Public-Choice Theory -- Chapter 4 Is Voluntary Government Possible? A Critique of Constitutional Economics -- Chapter 5 George Stigler and the Myth of Efficient Government -- Part 3: The Austrian Response to The Calculus of Consent -- Chapter 6 The Calculus of Consent Revisited -- Chapter 7 Buchanan and Tullock's "The Calculus of Consent" -- Chapter 8 Constitutional Economics and the Calculus of Consent -- Part 4: Austrians and Public Choicers on Antitrust -- Chapter 9 The Truth about Sherman -- Chapter 10 The Myth of Natural Monopoly -- Chapter 11 Monopolistic Competition and Macroeconomic Theory by Robert Solow -- Chapter 12 The Origins of Antitrust: An Interest-Group Perspective -- Chapter 13 Total Repeal of Antitrust Legislation: A Critique of Bork, Brozen, and Posner -- Part 5: Rent Seeking -- Chapter 14 Property Rights, Information Costs, and the Economics of Rent Seeking -- Chapter 15 All Government is Excessive: A Rejoinder to Dwight Lee's "In Defense of Excessive Government" -- Chapter 16 Watch Your Language -- Part 6: Taxation -- Chapter 17 Utility Profits,

Fiscal Illusion, and Local Public Expenditures -- Chapter 18 The Expenditure Effects of Restricting Competition in Local Public Service Industries: The Case of Special Districts -- Chapter 19 The Justification for Taxation in the Public Finance Literature: An Unorthodox View -- Part 7: Other Topics in Public Choice -- Chapter 20 A Constitutionalist Approach to Social Security Reform. Chapter 21 The Futility of Bureaucracy -- Chapter 22 Government and Market: A Critique of Professor James Buchanan's "What Should Economists" Do? -- Chapter 23 Economic Competition and Political Competition: An Empirical Note -- Chapter 24 An Empirical Assessment of the Factor-Supplier Pressure Group Hypothesis -- Back Cover.
