

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910792186503321
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Titolo	Collective action and exchange [[electronic resource] ] : a game-theoretic approach to contemporary political economy // William D. Ferguson
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Stanford, California, : Stanford Economics and Finance, an imprint of Stanford University Press, 2013
ISBN	0-8047-8556-2
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (447 p.)
Classificazione	QM 000
Disciplina	330.01/5193
Soggetti	Game theory Economics - Mathematical models
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto	Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: A Farmer's Market -- Chapter 1 Collective-Action Problems and Innovative Theory -- Chapter 2 The Basic Economics of Collective Action -- Chapter 3 Coordination, Enforcement, and Second-Order Collective-Action Problems -- Chapter 4 Seizing Advantage: Strategic Moves and Power in Exchange -- Chapter 5 Basic Motivation: Rational Egoists and Reciprocal Players -- Chapter 6 Foundations of Motivation: Rationality and Social Preference -- Chapter 7 Institutions, Organizations, and Institutional Systems -- Chapter 8 Informal Institutions -- Chapter 9 Internal Resolution via Group Self-Organization -- Chapter 10 Third-Party Enforcement, Formal Institutions, and Interactions with Self-Governance -- Chapter 11 Social Networks and Collective Action -- Chapter 12 Policy and Political Economy -- Appendix to Chapter 12 -- Chapter 13 Knowledge, Collective Action, Institutions, Location, and Growth -- Chapter 14 Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Index
Sommario/riassunto	In Collective Action and Exchange: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Contemporary Political Economy, William D. Ferguson presents a comprehensive political economy text aimed at advanced undergraduates in economics and graduate students in the social sciences. The text utilizes collective action as a unifying concept,

arguing that collective-action problems lie at the foundation of market success, market failure, economic development, and the motivations for policy. Ferguson draws on information economics, social preference theory, cognition theory, institutional economics, as well as political and policy theory to develop this approach. The text uses classical, evolutionary, and epistemic game theory, along with basic social network analysis, as modeling frameworks. These models effectively bind the ideas presented, generating a coherent theoretic approach to political economy that stresses sometimes overlooked implications.

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