

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910790285003321
Titolo	Over the horizon proliferation threats [[electronic resource] /] / edited by James J. Wirtz and Peter R. Lavoy
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Stanford, Calif., : Stanford University Press, c2012
ISBN	0-8047-8372-1
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (329 p.)
Altri autori (Persone)	LavoyPeter R <1961-> (Peter Rene) WirtzJames J. <1958->
Disciplina	327.1/747
Soggetti	Nuclear nonproliferation Nuclear weapons - Government policy
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto	Contents; Contributors; Acronyms; 1. Introduction - James J. Wirtz and Peter R. Lavoy; Part I: National Decisions in Perspective; 2. Japan's Nuclear Option - Katsuhisa Furukawa; 3. Will Taiwan Go Nuclear? - Arthur S. Ding; 4. Nuclear Proliferation and the Middle East's Security Dilemma: The Case of Saudi Arabia - James A. Russell; 5. Motivations and Capabilities to Acquire Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Weapons and Missiles: South Africa - Noel Stott; 6. Nuclear Energy and the Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation in Southeast Asia - Tanya Ogilvie-White and Michael S. Malley 7. Burma and Nuclear Proliferation - Andrew Selth 8. Hindsight and Foresight in South American Nonproliferation Trends in Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela - Etel Solingen; 9. Ukraine: The Case of a "Nuclear Inheritor" - Isabelle Facon; Part II: Fostering Nonproliferation; 10. The NPT Regime and the Challenge of Shaping Proliferation Behavior - Christopher A. Ford; 11. Leveraging Proliferation Shocks - Lewis A. Dunn; 12. Intelligence, Interdiction, and Dissuasion: Lessons from the Campaign against Libyan Proliferation - Wyn Q. Bowen 13. Security Assurances and the Future of Proliferation - Bruno Tertrais 14. Options and New Dynamics: Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation in 2020 - Michael Moodie; 15. Conclusion - Jeffrey W. Knopf; Index

Sommario/riassunto

In every decade of the nuclear era, one or two states have developed nuclear weapons despite the international community's opposition to proliferation. In the coming years, the breakdown of security arrangements, especially in the Middle East and Northeast Asia, could drive additional countries to seek their own nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons and missiles. This likely would produce greater instability, more insecure states, and further proliferation. Are there steps concerned countries can take to anticipate, prevent, or dissuade the next generation of proliferators? Are
