

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910790129603321
Autore	Bussell Jennifer <1975->
Titolo	Corruption and reform in India : public services in the digital age // Jennifer Bussell [[electronic resource]]
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2012
ISBN	1-107-23104-3 1-139-23460-9 1-280-64716-7 9786613633217 1-139-23314-9 1-139-23092-1 1-139-23237-1 1-139-22947-8 1-139-23392-0 1-139-09402-5
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (xiii, 306 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)
Classificazione	POL000000
Disciplina	352.3/50954
Soggetti	Public administration - Corrupt practices - India Political corruption - India Public administration - Corrupt practices - India - Prevention Political corruption - India - Prevention Administrative agencies - India - Reorganization
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto	1. Introduction -- 2. Explaining the politics of technology-enabled public services -- 3. Do reforms affect the quality of services? -- 4. Policy initiation in the Indian states -- 5. The scope of reform I: patterns of policy implementation -- 6. The scope of reform II: coalition governments -- 7. From "petty" to "grand" corruption: ownership, management, and the scale of reform -- 8. Technology-enabled administrative reforms in cross-national perspective -- 9. Conclusion.

Why do some governments improve public services more effectively than others? Through the investigation of a new era of administrative reform, in which digital technologies may be used to facilitate citizens' access to the state, Jennifer Bussell's analysis provides unanticipated insights into this fundamental question. In contrast to factors such as economic development or electoral competition, this study highlights the importance of access to rents, which can dramatically shape the opportunities and threats of reform to political elites. Drawing on a sub-national analysis of twenty Indian states, a field experiment, statistical modeling, case studies, interviews of citizens, bureaucrats and politicians, and comparative data from South Africa and Brazil, Bussell shows that the extent to which politicians rely on income from petty and grand corruption is closely linked to variation in the timing, management and comprehensiveness of reforms.
