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Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (xvi, 295 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)
Collana	Cambridge studies in comparative politics
Disciplina	320.01/1
Soggetti	Regionalism Equality Comparative government European Union countries Economic conditions Regional disparities North America Economic conditions Regional disparities
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
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Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto	List of tables -- List of figures -- Acknowledgments -- Regions and redistributions: introduction and overview -- A theory of fiscal structures in political unions -- The road ahead: the empirical strategy -- The European Union: economic geography and fiscal structures under centrifugal representation -- North America's divide: distributive tensions, risk sharing, and the centralization of public insurance in federations -- Germany's reunification: distributive tensions and fiscal structures and under centripetal representation -- Endogenous decentralization and welfare resilience: Spain, 1978-2007 -- The

legacy of history -- The political geography of inequality: summary and implications.

Sommario/riassunto

This book addresses two questions - why some political systems have more centralized systems of interpersonal redistribution than others, and why some political unions make larger efforts to equalize resources among their constituent units than others. This book presents a new theory of the origin of fiscal structures in systems with several levels of government. The argument points to two major factors to account for the variation in redistribution: the interplay between economic geography and political representation on the one hand, and the scope of interregional economic externalities on the other. To test the empirical implications derived from the argument, the book relies on in-depth studies of the choice of fiscal structures in unions as diverse as the European Union, Canada and the United States in the aftermath of the Great Depression; Germany before and after Reunification; and Spain after the transition to democracy.
