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Nota di contenuto	How to be a teleologist about epistemic reasons / Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen -- Is there reason to be theoretically rational? / Andrew Reisner -- Epistemic motivation: towards a metaethics of belief / Veli Mitova -- Error theory and reasons for belief / Jonas Olson -- Can reasons for belief be debunked? / Nishi Shah -- Reasons and belief's justification / Clayton Littlejohn -- Perception, generality, and reasons / Hannah Ginsborg -- Immediate warrant, epistemic responsibility, and Moorean dogmatism / Adam Leite -- Primitively rational belief-forming processes / Ralph Wedgwood -- What does it take to "have" a reason? / Mark Schroeder -- Knowledge and reasons for belief / Alan Millar --

What is the swamping problem? / Duncan Pritchard.

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Sommario/riassunto

Philosophers have long been concerned about what we know and how we know it. Increasingly, however, a related question has gained prominence in philosophical discussion: what should we believe and why? This volume brings together twelve new essays that address different aspects of this question. The essays examine foundational questions about reasons for belief, and use new research on reasons for belief to address traditional epistemological concerns such as knowledge, justification and perceptually acquired beliefs. This book will be of interest to philosophers working on epistemology, theoretical reason, rationality, perception and ethics. It will also be of interest to cognitive scientists and psychologists who wish to gain deeper insight into normative questions about belief and knowledge.

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