Record Nr. UNINA9910789401503321 Autore Gillette Clayton P Titolo Local redistribution and local democracy [[electronic resource]]: interest groups and the courts / / Clayton P. Gillette New Haven, : Yale University Press, c2011 Pubbl/distr/stampa **ISBN** 1-283-15062-X 9786613150622 0-300-17182-X Descrizione fisica xiii, 235 p Disciplina 339.20973 Soggetti Distribution (Economic theory) Local government - United States Local finance - United States Lingua di pubblicazione Inglese **Formato** Materiale a stampa Livello bibliografico Monografia Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph Note generali Nota di bibliografia Includes bibliographical references and index. Nota di contenuto The scope of local competence -- Why does local autonomy matter? --The meaning and scope of local redistribution -- Why do local governments redistribute? -- Local political markets and state constitutional constraints -- Proxies for distinguishing benign and malign redistribution -- The limits of judicial intervention --Conclusion. The traditional theory of urban finance argues against local Sommario/riassunto redistribution of wealth on the assumption that such action is likely to chase away the relatively wealthy, leaving only the impoverished behind. Nevertheless, Clayton P. Gillette observes, local governments engage in substantial redistribution, both to the wealthy and to the poor.In this thoughtful book, Gillette examines whether recent

chase away the relatively wealthy, leaving only the impoverished behind. Nevertheless, Clayton P. Gillette observes, local governments engage in substantial redistribution, both to the wealthy and to the poor. In this thoughtful book, Gillette examines whether recent campaigns to enact "living wage" ordinances and other local redistributive programs represent gaps in the traditional theory or political opportunism. He then investigates the role of the courts in distinguishing between these explanations. The author argues that courts have greater capacity to review local programs than is typically assumed. He concludes that when a single interest group dominates

the political process, judicial intervention to determine a program's

legal validity may be appropriate. But if the political contest involves competing groups, courts should defer to local political judgments.