Record Nr. UNINA9910788414603321 Zhang Zhiwei Autore Titolo Collateral Damage:: Exchange Controls and International Trade // Zhiwei Zhang, Shang-Jin Wei Pubbl/distr/stampa Washington, D.C.:,: International Monetary Fund,, 2007 **ISBN** 1-4623-6088-2 1-4527-5113-7 1-283-51148-7 1-4519-1025-8 9786613823939 Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (41 p.) Collana **IMF** Working Papers Altri autori (Persone) WeiShang-Jin Disciplina 343.032 Soggetti Foreign exchange - Law and legislation International trade Balance of payments Non-tariff trade barriers **Exports and Imports** Foreign Exchange **Taxation** International Investment **Long-term Capital Movements Trade Policy** International Trade Organizations Trade: General Currency Foreign exchange International economics Public finance & taxation Exchange restrictions Capital controls **Tariffs Imports** Capital movements **Tariff** 

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Lingua di pubblicazione Inglese **Formato** Materiale a stampa Livello bibliografico Monografia "January 2007." Note generali Nota di bibliografia Includes bibliographical references (p. 14-15). Nota di contenuto Cover Page: Title Page: Copyright Page: Contents: I. Introduction: II. Exchange Controls: Some Basic Patterns; 1. Evolutions of Restriction Indices; 1a. Summary Statistics for Restriction Indices; 1b. Correlations of the Control Indices, Tariff, and NTB Index: 2. Control Indices in Selected Countries; III. Statistical Analysis; 2. Benchmark Regressions; 3. Adding Time-varying Price Indices; 4. Developing Countries; 5. Additional Controls: Corruption and Trade Openness: 6. Finer Classification of Exchange Controls; 7. Emerging Market Economies during 1996-99; IV. Concluding Remarks 1. Exchange Controls: Source, Measurement, and Indices 2. List of Countries in the Sample; References; Footnotes While new conventional wisdom warns that developing countries should Sommario/riassunto be aware of the risks of premature capital account liberalization, the costs of not removing exchange controls have received much less attention. This paper investigates the negative effects of exchange controls on trade. To minimize evasion of controls, countries often intensify inspections at the border and increase documentation requirements. Thus, the cost of conducting trade rises. The paper finds that a one standard-deviation increase in the controls on trade payment has the same negative effect on trade as an increase in tariff by about 14 percentage points. A one standard-deviation increase in the controls on FX transactions reduces trade by the same amount as a rise in tariff by 11 percentage points. Therefore, the collateral damage

in terms of foregone trade is sizable.