1. Record Nr. UNINA9910788407403321 Autore Estevão Marcello **Titolo** Are the French Happy with the 35-Hour Workweek? / / Marcello Estevão, Filipa Sa Washington, D.C.:,: International Monetary Fund,, 2006 Pubbl/distr/stampa **ISBN** 1-4623-3869-0 1-4527-5618-X 1-283-51592-X 1-4519-0964-0 9786613828378 Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (26 p.) Collana **IMF** Working Papers Altri autori (Persone) SaFilipa Hours of labor - France - Econometric models Soggetti Workweek - France - Econometric models Labor Macroeconomics **Employment** Unemployment Wages Intergenerational Income Distribution Aggregate Human Capital Aggregate Labor Productivity Time Allocation and Labor Supply Single Equation Models Single Variables: Cross-Sectional Models **Spatial Models Treatment Effect Models** Labor Economics: General Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search Aggregate Factor Income Distribution Labour income economics Income National accounts Labor economics Economic theory France

Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	"November 2006."
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references (p. 24).
Nota di contenuto	""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH""; ""III. CONSEQUENCES OF HOURS RESTRICTIONS: THEORY""; ""IV. DATA AND IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY""; ""V. RESULTS""; ""VI. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES""
Sommario/riassunto	Legally mandated reductions in the workweek can be either a constraint on individuals' choice or a tool to coordinate individuals' preferences for lower work hours. We confront these two hypotheses by studying the consequences of the workweek reduction in France from 39 to 35 hours, which was first applied to large firms in 2000. Using the timing difference by firm size to set up a quasi-experiment and data from the French labor force survey, we show that the law constrained the choice of a significant number of individuals: dual-job holdings increased, some workers in large firms went to small firms where hours were not constrained, and others were replaced by cheaper, unemployed individuals as relative hourly wages increased in large firms. Employment of persons directly affected by the law declined, although the net effect on aggregate employment was not significant.